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The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the last occasion on which 
global financial turbulence approached that currently being experienced, witnessed 
the rise of the postures of neo-liberalism to an extreme and unprecedented extent, and 
in equally extreme and unprecedented forms, across each of scholarship, policy and 
ideology. Today, that bubble has burst together with the financial and economic 
system to which it has given rise. It is a time for bold and innovative thinking. Yet, 
even before recent events had exposed the fragility of the neo-liberal era, and sent 
finance galloping to the state in a desperate attempt to save itself from itself, neo-
liberal hegemony had already been brought into question, not least in the wake of 
what has been the most limited progress in development and poverty alleviation under 
or through its auspices.  
 
 Such considerations raise the question of whether bold and innovative 
thinking, let alone corresponding policy perspectives, are on the agenda. Despite the 
crisis being of three or four years vintage, the unambiguous answer seems to be in the 
negative. Of course, neo-liberalism was shaken by the crisis but it seems to have 
survived intact or even strengthened. Within economics itself, despite murmurings of 
discontent, there has been business as (un)usual with at most the concession that the 
wrong models were applied with insufficiently refined behavioural assumptions and 
account for material, or financial, realities. Otherwise, the methods and technical 
apparatuses and architectures associated with optimisation, efficiency and equilibrium 
are judged to be sound. Significantly, a recent google scholar search on “crisis in 
economics” offers only a few hundred entries, most dating back to the 1930s. By 
contrast, a similar search on sociology runs into thousands of entries although, of 
course, no one is blaming the sociologist, as opposed to the economists, for being 
responsible for, or complicit with, the crisis.  
 
 Of course, there has been some increase in the kudos and prominence of 
dissidents within economics, who had previously been marginalised to an 
extraordinary degree by the command of orthodoxy over the discipline. The putative 
Minsky moment has had its moment once more. But, in turning attention to those 
dissidents within orthodoxy (understood as practising with the methods and tools of 
the mainstream), it is striking how little they have reconsidered their approaches and, 
of much greater significance, how little they have influenced policy despite 
considerable popular prominence and profile.  
 
 Before, then, putting forward bolder alternatives, it is appropriate to question 
why both alternatives and alternative thinking have been so limited, not only over a 
long period but even in the more conducive conditions presented by the financial 
crisis that makes them so imperative. Of course, one part of an answer is to be found 
in the development of economics itself and of development economics in particular.2 
These do not, however, float entirely free from developments within the economy 
itself and, this leads to consideration of two paradoxes.  
 
The first concerns the nature of the current crisis, particularly in relation to 
what economics orthodoxy used to refer to as the soundness of “fundamentals”. The 
latter might be thought to refer to levels of deficits and the like but at a more 
fundamental level, the fundamental “fundamentals” as it were related to underlying 
material conditions, the prospects for the global economy, have been extraordinarily 
strong both over the last thirty years of relatively slow growth compared to the post-
war boom and into the current crisis. To be specific, what I have in mind, if simply 
listing and unduly overgeneralising for brevity: the capacity for productivity increase 
arising out of a huge diversity and range of application of new technologies; the 
decline in the strength and organisation of working class and progressive movements, 
especially across trade unions, political parties and anti-imperial struggles; huge 
increases in the global labour force through migration, the Chinese road to capitalism, 
and increasing female labour market participation; high levels of advanced country 
cooperation under the hegemony of the USA not least with the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc; and the triumph of neo-liberalism, not least in the form of containment of the 
social as well as the monetary wage.  
 
In this light, the second paradox concerns the responses to the current global 
crisis. There can be little doubt that the neoliberal ideology of targeting minimal state 
intervention and leaving as much as possible, especially finance, to the free market 
has taken something of a battering. But the policy responses in practice have remained 
extraordinarily timid and limited in scope. If, for example, the state is making a 
comeback, it certainly is not along the lines experienced during the post-war boom 
when Keynesian macroeconomic policies were complemented by a whole, arguably 
more important, sheaf of interventionist policies around health, education, welfare and 
industrial and regional development. Rather, as symbolised by the notion of 
“quantitative easing”, the top priority is to restore the viability of the financial system. 
This is accompanied at most by weakening and token deference to re-regulation and 
clawing back of disproportionate rewards. Stimulus to effective demand has primarily 
been adopted in the mildest forms of Keynesianism through monetary policy whilst 
directed fiscal stimuli take a back seat (or are thrown off the transport altogether, as 
the deficits that have accompanied support to finance dictate austerity measures to 
cover interest payments to the very financial system that has created the problem and 
had, accordingly, to be rescued). This is all despite what is a unique characteristic of 
the current crisis, the common acceptance that it is in general in no way due to 
excessive wage demands or state expenditure to furnish a social wage. Nonetheless, 
the blameless in working and social conditions are being hit very hard and to an 
extent that would, or should, make even neo-liberals or proponents of the Washington 
Consensus blush. If the post Washington Consensus is alive and well, as its supporters 
are no doubt aware, it is not in the world of policy. 
 
How do we resolve these paradoxes? For the first, slowdown and crisis despite 
the most favourable fundamentals, I point to “financialisation”. This is a new term, 
little more than a decade old, and it has yet to bed down in terms of what it is, what it 
does and how it is to be addressed theoretically. Perhaps, across these issues, it should 
remain controversial. I hope so as this would indicate significant attention to the 
defining economic character of the contemporary period so diverse is financialisation 
in content and so contested is monetary and financial theory – ranging from the nature 
and origins of money through to the efficient (or inefficient) market hypothesis and 
Minsky’s moments. In brief, financialisation has involved: the phenomenal expansion 
of financial assets relative to real activity (by three times over the last thirty years); 
the proliferation of types of assets, from derivatives through to futures markets with a 
corresponding explosion of acronyms; the absolute and relative expansion of 
speculative as opposed to or at the expense of real investment; a shift in the balance of 
productive to financial imperatives within the private sector whether financial or not; 
increasing inequality in income arising out of weight of financial rewards; consumer-
led booms based on credit; the penetration of finance into ever more areas of 
economic and social life such as pensions, education, health, and provision of 
economic and social infrastructure; the emergence of a neo-liberal culture of reliance 
upon markets and private capital and corresponding anti-statism despite the extent to 
which the rewards to private finance have in part derived from state finance itself. 
Financialisation is also associated with the continued role of the US dollar as world 
money despite, at least in the current crisis, its deficits in trade, capital account, the 
fiscus, and consumer spending, and minimal rates of interest. I observe here, in 
passing and for future reference, that the policies adopted by the USA and some other 
developed countries have been exactly the opposite of those advised, or should that be 
imposed, on developing countries experiencing similar crises in the past. As Ha-Joon 
Chang has been at the forefront of arguing in the context of historical paths to 
development, those that have traversed it insist, “Do not do as we did, do as we say” 
to which should be added the nostrum, “Do not do as we do, do as we say”. 
 
However we define financialisation, its consequences have been: reductions in 
overall levels and efficacy of real investment as financial instruments and activities 
expand at its expense even if excessive investment does take place in particular 
sectors at particular times (as with the dotcom bubble of a decade ago); prioritising 
shareholder value, or financial worth, over other economic and social values; pushing 
of policies towards conservatism and commercialisation in all respects; extending 
influence of finance more broadly, both directly and indirectly, over economic and 
social policy; placing more aspects of economic and social life at the risk of volatility 
from financial instability and, conversely, places the economy and social life at risk of 
crisis from triggers within particular markets (as with the food and energy crises that 
preceded the financial crisis). Whilst, then, financialisation is a single word, it is 
attached to a wide variety of different forms and effects of finance with the USA and 
the UK to the fore. And, even if exposed in acute form by the crisis, its expansion 
over the last few decades has been at the expense of the real economy despite 
otherwise extraordinarily favourable “fundamentals” as already remarked. It should 
also be emphasised that the forms, incidence and consequences of financialisation are 
highly uneven and diverse across and within national economies as sharply revealed 
by the current global crisis both within finance itself and more generally.3 
 
Financialisation is also the key to resolving the second paradox, why the 
return of the state in the wake of the crisis should be so weak and narrowly confined. 
One reason has already been implicitly identified as a component part of the first 
paradox – the weakness of progressive movements that are more aligned to state 
intervention. In addition, though, also deriving from the first paradox, the last thirty 
years has witnessed the emergence, growth, strengthening and institutionalisation 
within governance and beyond of financial elites at domestic and international levels. 
As already observed, this implies not only particular sets of policies towards 
promoting private capital both directly, through privatisation for example, and 
indirectly through fiscal austerity, but also the transformation of the capacity to 
conceive and formulate alternative policy itself. I have, on a personal note, been 
associated with the Municipal Services Project, funded by the Canadian development 
agency, IDRC, http://www.municipalservices.org/. It has over some time been 
monitoring the effects of privatisation and commercialisation of basic services across 
the developing world. In its latest phase, it adopted the different stance of seeking out 
best practice alternatives underpinned by a more significant role for state provision. I 
am sorry to report that these are almost impossible to find and not because the state 
must or does perform worse than the private sector, as popular neoliberal rhetoric 
would suggest. Instead, it is apparent that developments over the past thirty years 
have tended both to squeeze out the presence of public sector alternatives where they 
do exist and also, and equally important, preclude them from emerging in the first 
place.  
 
Consequently, it is germane to pinpoint the relationship between 
financialisation and neo-liberalism. It is no accident that the two should coincide with 
one another over the period of the last thirty years. This is certainly true at the 
ideological level as the imperative of freeing markets has been applied first and 
foremost to those pure markets associated with finance. But finance has also been 
associated with the emergence, strengthening and influence of financial elites at both 
national and international levels.  
 
As a result, I do not see financialisation as a simple associate of neo-liberalism 
but as its defining or underlying aspect, with a reach that goes far beyond financial 
markets themselves. To make sense and even to defend this posture, two further 
points need to be made. The first is to highlight significant connections but also 
inconsistencies across the ideologies, the scholarship and policies in practice of neo-
liberalism. These have a shifting relationship to one another across time, place and 
topic. I have argued this at great length elsewhere, particularly in the context of 
development, Fine (2001 and 2010a), Fine et al (eds) (2001) and Bayliss et al (eds) 
(2011). Crucial, for example, is that, despite its scholarship and rhetoric, neo-
liberalism has always been heavily associated with state intervention. This has, 
however, been intervention to promote private capital in general and finance in 
particular. The response to the current crisis is no exception in which the crisis within, 
and not of, neo-liberalism has been associated with extraordinary measures of support 
to finance both in levels of finance and even in nationalisation of failing financial 
institutions. Indeed, so powerful has been finance’s influence over policy in the wake 
of the crisis that it has jokingly been described as “socialism for the bankers” and as 
not a case of government Treasuries nationalising the banks but of the banks 
nationalising the Treasuries! 
 
This is all indicative of a further feature of the relationship between 
financialisation and neo-liberalism that, very roughly, the latter falls into two phases 
divided by the early 1990s. The first phase is aptly characterised as shock therapy in 
which, most strikingly, first in Latin America and, subsequently, in the former Soviet 
bloc, the promotion of private capital proceeded without regard to the consequences. 
The second phase has been, if only in part, a reaction to the consequences of the first 
phase in terms of the dysfunctions created, not least in social welfare provision, but it 
is also more marked by explicit intervention by the state to sustain the processes of, 
and underpinning, financialisation. Once again, this is one way of perceiving 
responses to the crisis. And it is, for example, borne out by the shifting policy stances 
on privatisation, to which I will return below in the context of social policy.  
 
It is hardly surprising, then, that the neo-liberalism/financialisation dualism 
should tend to preclude alternative thinking and policy. As Mkandawire (2009, p. 45-
6) perceptively observes: 
 
On the assumption that the appropriate structures to emerge will be dictated by 
market forces, the contemporary strategy of poverty reduction is usually silent 
on sectoral policies. The model that has dominated economic policy during the 
past two decades has tended to treat any specific sectoral policies that are not 
axiomatically derived from the core model as ‘distortions’. Up until recently, 
‘industrial policy’, ‘social policy’ and ‘labour market policies’ were only 
acceptable if they involved self-negation and meant the extension of the reign 
of the market to these spheres.  
 
In other words, and to some degree remarkably, proper consideration of such policies 
has been taken off the agenda or, when they do make it on, they have been 
considerably reduced  in scope of content and application with this being equally true 
of those who offer opposition to pure reliance upon market forces. Both our material 
and intellectual worlds have been heavily constrained by financialisation, and positive 
prospects for development, and for the state’s role upon it, depend upon insulating 
policy from financialisation so that economic and social reproduction is served by 
finance rather than the other way about. 
 
 Of course, as emphasised, financialisation is both multi-dimensional and 
uneven across and within each dimension across and within developed and 
developing worlds. Indeed, financialisation is generally least developed in LDCs and, 
to some degree, mercifully, this has allowed them to avoid the direct impact of 
contagion from the global spread of the financial crisis through financial markets 
themselves. But indirect effects have been significant in terms of loss of export 
markets with global recession and loss of migrant remittances, and there has been 
volatility and spikes in food and energy prices, with some gains from raw material 
prices where supply rather than demand has been on the short side.  
 
In effect, the direct impact of financialisation on LDCs has as yet most 
probably been greatest where the influence of global (or external) factors have been 
most important rather than through domestic developments within financial systems. 
This involves externally imposed adjustment policies, and the corresponding 
liberalisation of capital movements, and the corresponding liberalisation of capital 
movements, exposing economies to the risk of capital flight or destabilising inflows 
(now acknowledged as a risk by the IMF)4 and the high cost of holding reserves to 
guard against such eventualities. 
 
Otherwise, financialisation is more likely to have proceeded through the 
opening of domestic banking systems to foreign competition, again under the auspices 
of IFI conditionalities, promising much in terms of the mobilisation and allocation of 
finance for domestic investment. In practice, the evidence suggests totally different 
outcomes as foreign banks have targeted personal banking of the wealthiest 
individuals as opposed to developmental finance. The liberalisation/deregulation 
model for developed countries now lies in tatters, but its impact upon developing 
countries has been equally significant not least across appropriate sequencing of both 
reform (prior availability of appropriate regulation and stability) and promotion of 
different types of developmental finance. As Van Waeyenberge et al (2011, p. 21) 
summarise from the fuller account of dos Santos (2011), and the corresponding 
indefensible defence of IFI research in favour of foreign bank entry and banking 
liberalisation: 
 
Foreign bank entry then grew rapidly in Latin American and East European 
countries. The result was a major shift in the structure of lending away from 
domestic enterprises to individuals. Lending behaviour by foreign banks 
created vulnerabilities in host economies around the world. 
 
Further, as Demir (2009, p. 314) claims for “the first empirical study that looks into 
the portfolio choice real sector firms in developing countries face between real and 
financial sector activities … increasing availability and accessibility of alternative 
investment opportunities in financial markets when combined with domestic market 
rigidities and uncertainty can become instrumental in channelling real sector savings 
to short-term financial investments instead of long-term fixed capital formation and 
thus lead to deindustrialization in those economies”.  He concludes that as, “rather 
than investing in irreversible long-term fixed investment projects, firms may choose 
to invest in reversible short-term financial investments … there is a need to reorganize 
the financial system in such a way that domestic (and foreign) savings are directed 
towards productive investments instead of financial ones”, p. 322. 
 
 And, if we can take the step of reorganising the financial system, there 
remains the issue of the how greater availability of longer-term resources might be 
deployed. In this vein, in later sections, I bring industrial and social policy back onto 
the agenda as well as considerations of the developmental state. But, before doing so, 
I offer an account of new growth theory in part because of the light it does, or does 
not, shed on considerations of growth and development, and also in part because it 
illustrates the malaise that is characteristic of the new development economics, how it 
differs from the old development economics, and how the strengths of the latter can 




It is now a quarter of a century since Romer (1986) drafted his classic and 
pioneering paper on new growth theory. He could not have anticipated the explosion 
of research that would follow, not least given the modesty of his own research 
methods. As he confesses in retrospect on whether he was influenced by 
Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction, Snowdon and Vane (2005, p. 686):5 
 
No, I can honestly say that it has not. Schumpeter coined some wonderful 
phrases like ‘creative destruction’ but I did not read any of Schumpeter’s work 
when I was creating my model. As I said, I really worked that model out from 
a clean sheet of paper. To be honest, the times when I have gone to try to read 
Schumpeter I have found it tough going. It is really hard to tell what guys like 
Schumpeter are talking about [laughter]. 
 
Even if we reduce the issue of development to (endogenous) growth, contingent upon 
productivity increase, the resulting energy devoted to explaining it in theoretical and 
empirical terms has been astonishing. Hundreds of variables have been deployed and 
millions of regressions have been run.6 They offered the promise of using the results 
for economic and social engineering – the first model underpinning Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers, suggested the use of growth-elasticities to trade off policy 
variables whether it be through choice of the elimination of a black market in foreign 
exchange or the number of telephone lines per thousand head of population.7 
 
Now, from similar exercises, especially in the consequences of financial 
liberalisation and the impact of trade openness, we should have been cautious about 
the intellectual, let alone the statistical, stability of banging out empirical results, 
whether on the basis of refined or elementary models. The outcome has been 
disappointing with a significant literature expressing doubts about the theoretical and 
empirical rationale of the exercise itself, that growth “models” cannot be common 
across countries.8 Yet, interestingly, so extensive has been the empirical work that it 
has given rise to the emergence of the subfield of growth econometrics, with 
corresponding survey articles.   
 
What do we learn from these?9 First as many as fifty or so growth theories are 
identified as well as three times as many variables (with corresponding opportunities 
for publication bias – towards finding positive or, at least, significant results – and 
data mining). Second, whilst most economies have grown over the past forty years, 
growth rates across countries have diverged to an unprecedented extent other than for 
all but the richest countries irrespective of initial conditions (casting doubt on 
convergence hypotheses). Third, growth across the globe has been poorer between 
1980 and 2000 than in the previous two decades and with more dispersion of growth 
rates (although there have been “take-offs” for China and India incorporating two-
fifths of the world’s population). Fourth, there have been convergence clubs of 
nations around growth rates, roughly coinciding with East and South-East Asia, South 
and Central America and Sub-Saharan Africa (in order of declining performance). 
Fifth, identifying the causes of take-offs and slumps in growth are of importance. 
Sixth, policy change and reform can be of significance as can be the more or less 
favourable response to more general “shocks”. Seventh, there is a need for country-
specific study focusing on historical and institutional context.  
 
Stepping back from these lessons, we can draw three more general 
conclusions. The first is to reinforce the conclusion that models are liable to collapse 
the complexity and diversity of the growth experience, partly because of the nature of 
the beast itself and partly because of the nature of the models whether by virtue of 
necessity or by design in light of how theory and modelling have evolved in practice. 
Second is to observe the inconsistency between the empirical results and the theories 
from which they derive, ones that are almost universally based upon a dynamic 
organised around steady state balanced growth. Third is the almost unwitting 
revisiting of the old development economics in the sense of seeking out empirical 
regularities and explanations and precedents for them, even if on the basis of 
considerably larger, later and more diverse data sets and more refined statistical 
techniques. 
 
This is, however, to revisit not to reproduce and update the old development 
economics. It was bound by the inductively and historically derived experience of the 
developed countries, with emphasis upon the processes of industrialisation, 
urbanisation, agrarian and demographic transitions, and so on, with the expectation 
that similar patterns would be followed by developing countries as captured in the 
notion of modernisation. It also emerged during an entirely different intellectual and 
material climate.10 The latter was dominated by the processes of decolonisation the 
context of the Cold War and, possibly the most influential contribution in this respect, 
is Walt Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 
emphasis italicised. It carried a message to the world that could not be clearer in the 
wake of the launch of the Sputnik in 1957 and the perceived threat of Soviet 
economic and technological catch-up. Whilst Rostow’s ideological credentials could 
not have been stronger in support of US hegemony, and his volume was to go through 
three editions and sell three hundred thousand copies, his own stance on economic 
history was not supportive of the single-minded theory and numbers characteristic of 
the then emerging cliometric (or new economic history) school. His schema for 
development followed a stylised induction of stages of economic growth from the 
experience of the developed countries. Whilst in part relying on standard growth 
theory, for Rostow, the ultimate causes of such growth are situated in a framework of 
modernisation, of breaking up of traditional societies and, correspondingly, of major 
shifts in political, cultural and social variables that are not reducible to the economic.  
 
This is a consequence of the then established style of economic history to 
which Rostow adhered, but it also reflects his keen commitment to distance his 
approach from the “economic reductionism” that he attaches to Marxism. Indeed, his 
book’s last chapter is devoted to a critique of Marxism for its economic reductionism 
(making up 15% or so of the main body of the text). The (mis)representation of Marx 
should not be taken too seriously except as a fascinating ideological text, reflecting 
(lack of) scholarly values of the time, but the nature of his construct of Marxism is 
instructive, (Rostow 1991, p. 149):  
 
The first and most fundamental difference between the two analyses lies in the 
view taken of human motivation. Marx’s system is, like classical economics, a 
set of more or less sophisticated logical deductions from the notion of profit 
maximization. 
 
Ironically, this is a better description of the “economics imperialism” of the present 
day, Fine and Milonakis (2009). Indeed, Rostow (1957, p. 510) stated his preference 
for interdisciplinarity “because I was repelled by Marx’s economic determinism”. In 
contrast, “In the stages-of-growth sequence man is viewed as a more complex unit. 
He seeks, not merely economic advantage, but also power, leisure, adventure, 
continuity of experience and security; he is concerned with his family, the familiar 
values of his regional and national culture, and a bit of fun down at the local … In 
short, net human behaviour is seen not as an act of maximization, but as an act of 
balancing alternative and often conflicting human objectives in the face of the range 
of choices men perceive to be open to them”, Rostow (1991, p. 149). 
 
In short, from its own perspective, Rostow provides a manifesto of sorts more 
against neoclassical economics than Marxism by seeking to retain the notion of a 
more rounded individual. His antipathy to the idea that history can be reduced to the 
optimising individual could not be plainer. For, “The theorist has generally been 
uneasy if not awkward if forced to work outside Marshallian short-period 
assumptions; the historian – like the human beings he writes about – cannot avoid 
working in a world of changing tastes and institutions, changing population, 
technology, and capacity”, Rostow (1957, p. 514). Thus, the old development 
economics carved a place for itself, like much applied economics more generally, 
outside the domain of both microeconomics and macroeconomics. In part, this 
reflected an acceptance that development was to be construed as something more than 
the economic as traditionally conceived, with a corresponding deference to the limited 
applicability of depending exclusively on “rationality” and needing to incorporate the 
insights and methods of the other social sciences to explain development fully. 
 
Even if, as suggested by the account of new growth theory and for other 
reasons and applications too, the new development economics has warmed to some of 
the themes of the old, it does so by entirely different methods and theory. It is highly 
dependent upon deductive models, especially those derived from mainstream 
neoclassical economics, with little or no conscious reliance upon inductive and 
historical investigation as such, incorporating little historical and social specificity 
other possibly than to guide choice of model. For the Washington Consensus, 
universally acknowledged as an explicit rejection of the old development economics 
and its reliance upon the state as an instrument for achieving modernisation, the 
theoretical underpinnings are made explicit by Anne Krueger, Chief Economist at the 
World Bank between 1982 to 1986. In the first issue of the World Bank Research 
Observer, she asserts, “Once it is recognised that individuals respond to incentives, 
and that ‘market failure’ is the result of inappropriate incentives rather than non-
responsiveness, the separateness of development economics as a field largely 
disappears”, Krueger (1986, p. 62). Whilst the subsequent post Washington 
Consensus, PWC, has been more state-friendly and more reliant upon market 
imperfections in orientation, it is no less committed to the same methodology albeit 
with contingent eclecticism in relation to model choice. As Dani Rodrik (2007, p. 3) 
whose One Economics, Many Recipes, emphasis added, could not be more explicit, 
emphasis added: 
 
At the core of neoclassical economics lies the following methodological 
predisposition: social phenomena can best be understood by considering them 
to be an aggregation of purposeful behavior by individuals—in their roles as 
consumer, producer, investor, politician, and so on—interacting with each 
other and acting under the constraints that their environment imposes. This I 
find to be not just a powerful discipline for organizing our thoughts on 
economic affairs, but the only sensible way of thinking about them. 
 
Accordingly, it is possible to suggest the Washington Consensus and PWC have as 
much in common as they differ along the market versus state spectrum. Each adopts 
the same, extraordinarily reduced, method and underlying neoclassical principles; 
each, nonetheless, applies these across an ever-widening range of economic and 
social applications, and neither has a concept of development itself as opposed to a 
means to achieve it (reliance upon the market as opposed to piecemeal correction of 
market and institutional imperfections as and when these can be identified and 
remedied with positive outcome).11 
 
As a result, the marriage of new development economics with some limited 
restoration of the old is an inappropriate mix by which to assess the record of the past 
and the prospects, and policies, for the future.12 Nor is it sufficient simply to restore 
the old, contingent as it was upon its own context and the necessary inability to take 
account of changed circumstances as well as the decades of subsequent experience 
since it has gone into decline. How, then, to proceed? I do so by re-examining three 
core concepts that have paralleled rather than bridged the passage from what might be 
termed the pre to the post Washington Consensus. These are the development state, 
industrial policy and the welfare state. 
 
Lessons from the Developmental State Paradigm 
 
What is it that characterises a developmental state and what makes it so? 
Answers to these apparently simple questions are elusive. This is not just because of 
denial of the potential for, or desirability of, the developmental state in deference to 
the market as associated with the Washington Consensus. For nor does the 
Developmental State Paradigm, DSP, itself offer satisfactory responses. One reason 
for this is the tension between the universal applicability of the DSP (its analytical 
framework should apply everywhere, in principle, explaining as required both success 
and failure) and its often confinement in practice to examples of success. 
 
This tension, and how it has itself been resolved, is brought out by 
acknowledging that the DSP readily if roughly divides into two separate schools, as 
highlighted in successive surveys of the DSP literature, Fine and Stoneman (1996), 
Fine and Rustomjee (1997) and Fine (2004, 2006a, 2007, and 2010b and c) and 
Ashman et al (2010), emphasis has been placed upon two different ways in explaining 
how successful development has been and might be achieved, this being the goal of 
the developmental state literature.13  
 
For one, termed the economic school, the focus is on those (economic) 
policies, often narrowly drawn and conceived, that are necessary for an economy to 
achieve development. Drawing primarily on the idea that markets do not work 
perfectly and, correspondingly, upon (imperfect market) economics as a discipline, 
the state is required to accrue, for example, the economies of scale and scope, to 
coordinate investments within and across sectors, to harness positive and eliminate 
negative externalities, and so on. For the economic school, then, it is a matter of 
identifying the appropriate policies, with the presumption that they will be 
implemented by a developmental state because they ought to be. 
 
By contrast, and completely complementary, the political school with its own 
disciplinary origins predominantly from within political science (and certainly 
separate from economics), is remarkably aloof from consideration of the economy 
itself and the nature of the policies required to bring about development. Rather, the 
political school is concerned with the nature of the state itself and whether it has the 
potential in general, and the independence in particular, to adopt the necessary 
policies more or less irrespective of what these might be. Here emphasis is placed 
upon the necessity for the developmental state to be free of capture by particular 
interests, and so to be able to adopt developmental policies. 
 
Taken together, the economic and political schools address what policies are 
to be adopted and what allows them to be adopted. Successful cases of development 
in practice can be interpreted through this dual prism, and such is a major 
methodological thrust of both schools. For each has been highly inductive in practice, 
examining the role of economic policy in bringing about development and the nature 
of the states adopting such policies. This is not to suggest, however, that the 
developmental state literature has been without theory or analytical content. The 
economic school, for example, strongly emphasises the significance of market 
imperfections and the role of a developmental state in addressing, if not necessarily 
correcting them. In highlighting the departure from neo-liberalism, Amsden (1989) 
famously declared that it was a matter of “getting relative prices wrong”, of not 
conforming to the dictates of the market.14 In principle, the economic school could 
have drawn upon orthodox economics and its deductive methods, especially in its 
emphasis upon market imperfections. In practice, though, as indicated, it has been 
drawn towards more inductive and case study methods, and it has generally been 
characterised as sharing a mutual suspicion with orthodoxy even when the latter is 
based on market imperfections.15 
 
Similarly, the political school has tried to identify empirically what 
characterises the nature of the states, and the societies containing them, in which 
development has proven possible. Posing this in terms of the independence of the 
state from economic or other interests has itself presumed an analytical approach in 
which society is structured along the lines of the state as opposed to the market, with 
the addition of civil society to fill out the remaining economic, political and 
ideological space. In this way, not only is the (developmental) state seen as potentially 
independent, the term favoured is autonomous, it is also perceived to evolve interests 
of its own that prevail over those of the market and civil society, especially where 
these conflict with developmentalism. This approach of the political school is 
admirably captured in the notion of “Bringing the State back in” as an agent of 
development in its own right, Evans and Rueschemeyer (eds) (1985).16  
 
 Across both economic and political schools, then, there is a predilection to set 
up an opposition between state and market. For the economic school, the state 
overrules the market and so is able to improve upon it. For the political school, the 
state needs to stand aloof of the market, and the economic interests found within it. 
The result has been to downplay the role of class in the analysis, Radice (2008). With 
the economic school, it does not tend to appear at all for it is simply a matter of 
identifying the right policies and not whether they have sufficient support to be 
implemented, and on whose behalf or to whose benefit. On the other hand, matters are 
not so simple for the political school. It is not that class or more general economic 
interests are absent but it is important that the state has the capacity to neutralise if not 
to override them. And, of overwhelming importance if so much taken to be granted as 
more or less to remain unstated, there is a total pre-occupation with the nation-state 
and its capacity to bring about development irrespective of the impact of international 
or global factors.17 This does not mean that the global is absent, only that it needs to 
be incorporated as a positive (availability of catch-up technology, for example) or as a 
negative (competition from imports), influence in the policies to be adopted or the 
attainment of independence in policymaking.18  
 
 Such are the general characteristics of the economic and political schools, but 
the developmental state literature has a rhythm of greater or lesser prominence and a 
more detailed content in conformity with more general events and intellectual trends. 
Early traces of the economic school are to be found in the protectionism associated 
with Friedrich List in the nineteenth century and, for the political school, 
developmentalism is associated with nation-building through industrial and military 
strength.19 Latin American import substitution industrialisation from the 1930s until 
the 1980s is seen as successful (economic school) until radical populism placed undue 
burdens upon the state (political school).20 But the developmental state comes of age 
with the rise of the East Asian NICs in the post-war period. The classic case study 
derives from Johnson (1982) from within the political school, with his emphasising 
the role played by the Japanese trade and industry ministry, MITI. Significantly, this 
study, from a former CIA analyst, was confessed to be motivated by support for the 
United States in its Cold War aspirations, advising that the unrealistic and abstract 
propositions derived from neo-liberalism would not bring capitalist development, 
judging from the experience of Japan, and would make Soviet prescriptions more 
attractive (and he is particularly scathing of the propositions derived from mainstream 
economics), Johnson (2006). 
 
But, although still acknowledged as a classic contribution that stands alone in 
its own way in modern times in its message of the need for a powerful state agent to 
underpin industrialisation (and with a close account of Japan as latecomer as case 
study), the ensuing literature on the developmental state focused its critical attention 
entirely upon the target of neo-liberalism in general and the Washington Consensus in 
particular whose own version of neo-liberalism could only have been anticipated by 
Chalmers just a few years before. By contrast, by the mid-1980s, inspired by the 
developmental successes of the East Asian NICs and the unremitting hostility to state 
intervention being displayed by both the World Bank and the IMF, the DSP became 
one of the two leading strands of criticism of the conditions being attached to these 
organisations’ offer of aid.21 Apart from Amsden’s (1989) study of South Korea’s 
industrialisation, Wade’s (1990) account of Taiwan’s, offering the mantra of 
“Governing the Market”, also rapidly became a classic. 
 
The growing intellectual momentum of the DSP in the wake of the success of 
the East Asian NICs, and the incontrovertible evidence of extensive state intervention 
in these countries, was complemented by the growing sense of failure, indeed a crisis 
of legitimacy, of the Washington Consensus as the 1980s was appropriately seen as a 
lost decade as far as development elsewhere in the world was concerned. In the early 
1990s, the Japanese funded a study to reassess the role of the state in the East Asian 
NICs. It had three good reasons to do so. First, the Washington Consensus denied the 
historical reality of its own latecomer success. Second, it was on the point of 
becoming the leading donor to developing countries. And, third, most important of all, 
its own industrial strategy, of contracting out less technology-intensive production to 
countries within the Asia-Pacific Rim, required for success that this be supported by 
appropriate local industrial policies. Japan could hardly be expected to continue to 
pay for policies that it knew both to be based on falsehood and to be against its own 
interests!22 
 
In the event, the World Bank’s (1993) report on the East Asian NICs proved a 
remarkable piece of intellectual acrobatics. It did not deny that the state had 
intervened extensively but suggested that it had done so in a way that was market-
conforming, doing what the market would have done had it been working perfectly, 
an unassailable but vacuous position in support of the market. It further suggested that 
the conditions which had allowed for this were not to be found replicated elsewhere. 
Essentially, the relevance of the East Asian NICs as a model or models for 
development were discounted except to confirm the rule of following, or conforming 
to, the market.23  
 
Whether such a contorted logic could have prevailed for long is a moot point, 
especially given the shifting contradictory relationship between the scholarship, 
rhetoric, policy and representation of reality that emanates from the World Bank, 
Bayliss et al (eds) (2011). But the logic did not persist in any case but for reasons that 
witnessed not the triumph of the DSP but its demise from the second half of the 
1990s. First and foremost, the Asian financial crises of 1997/98 cast a long shadow 
over the region’s economic miracle, some economists even denying that it had ever 
occurred and arguing that it had simply reflected the heavy accumulation of resources 
as opposed to disproportionate increases in productivity.24 Second, though, the second 
half of the 1990s also witnessed the shift in the World Bank from the Washington to 
the PWC, inspired and launched by Joe Stiglitz in 1997 as Chief Economist at the 
Bank. Underpinning this shift in paradigm from neo-liberalism is the idea of market 
and institutional imperfections as the source of failing economic performance, and for 
policy to be addressed at correcting these in a piecemeal fashion. In addition to a more 
favourable stance in principle to the state, the Bank also placed emphasis upon good 
governance, the elimination of corruption, empowerment, and democracy, all 
elements that were supposed to enable the state to act developmentally. 
 
As a result, if in its own way, and at a microeconomic as opposed to a 
systemic level as far as the economics is concerned, the concerns of the 
developmental state had been at least partially addressed by the new Bank orthodoxy 
but also in a way that meant that the term never had to be used. The market versus 
state agenda set by the World Bank gave way to one of market plus state. 
Symbolically, the person who continues to be seen as leading proponent of the 
developmental state, Ha-Joon Chang, both tends not to use the term himself and 
aligned himself with the PWC, at least to the extent of editing a volume of Stiglitz’s 
contributions on his new paradigm, Chang (ed) (2001).25 
 
For a decade or so following the Asian crisis, then, the DSP went into decline. 
But it is important to recognise that doubts about its continuing relevance had already 
been sewn amongst its own practitioners before the crisis struck, particularly as far as 
South Korea in particular is concerned. The South Korean model of the 
developmental state eventually involved a focus on what might be termed the Giants 
of Asia’s Next Giant, to be found within the conglomerate chaebol system. Even 
before the financial crisis of 1997, it was being argued that the developmental state 
had become a victim of its own success, possibly as a general rule. For, in South 
Korea for example, it had spawned the chaebol and, hence, a powerful class of 
capitalists who were now in a position to challenge and, ultimately, to prevail over the 
state.26 In addition, the working class also becomes more numerous, organised and 
powerful with development (as industrialisation), together with demands for 
democratisation that challenges the authoritarian origins of the state’s autonomy.27 
 
Indeed, such insights inevitably informed the eruption of diagnoses over the 
causes of the crisis that emerged so rapidly despite the failure to anticipate its 
occurrence. In crudest form, these placed emphasis on corruption and rent-seeking at 
the expense of the role of the state and of coordinated industrial policy; more subtle 
was the idea of the demise of powers of the state over the chaebol as they pursued its 
favour through diversified profitable outlets in industry as well as property, financial 
and international markets; and, as already mentioned, there were those prepared to 
deny there had ever been a miracle, and yet others who emphasised the failure of the 
state to be able to hold off any longer the interventions of international capital as it 
sought, not without willing domestic partners, both to deregulate the state’s control of 
finance and to open the economy’s productive basis and markets to foreign 
multinationals.28 In short, following the crisis, the DSP suffered for a decade or so 
from being outflanked by the new PWC orthodoxy at the Bank and, paradoxically, 
with the DSP not finding itself on the more state-friendly PWC agenda, being caught 
by a pincer movement between the consequences of developmental success 
(capitalists emerge to challenge autonomy) and apparent revisionist interpretation of 
failure in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. 
 
Yet, without wishing to blame the victim, one of the unnoticed and essential 
features of the original DSP literature, which persisted with minor exceptions up to 
the new millennium (see below), is the extent to which it has been extraordinarily 
self-limiting, especially within the economic school. From the review given above, it 
is instructive to examine this in some detail. First and foremost, based on its inductive 
method of identifying developmental states, and explaining them in terms of the 
policies adopted and the capacity to adopt them, case studies within the 
developmental state literature have been self-selecting. Elsewhere, this has been 
parodied as a law of economics, Fine (2010c), that wherever there is developmental 
success (or not), the developmental state paradigm will be more or less casually 
applied and prosper.29 Of course, this is a process of self-limitation in practice rather 
than in principle. For, from a logical point of view, failed developmental states should 
also fall within the paradigm as case studies, those economies that did not adopt the 
right policies or were unable to do so. 
 
 In the event, this latter logic has not been followed other than cursorily. 
Rather, the literature, has proceeded primarily, but not exclusively, by providing a 
cumulative basket of successful case studies, with East Asia to the fore, and a few 
bright spots elsewhere such as Botswana, Mauritius, and the Republic of Ireland, 
Maundeni (2002) and Robinson (2009), Meisenhelder (1997), and O’Hearn (2000) 
and Riain (2000), respectively, for example. For the economic school, this has 
commendably lead to the conclusion that there is not a single model for the 
developmental state, as they share insufficient in common across the different East 
Asian economies. In a sense, this is all illustrated by the thrust of Chang’s (2002 and 
2007) work and message: that the developmental states of the past (the developed 
countries of today) did experience a wide variety of conditions and causes but these 
all diverged from the recommendations for both economic and non-economic policies 
that they currently offer to the developing world (especially as regards neo-liberalism 
and the premature burdens of democracy and modernisation). In this way, failed 
developmental states or, more exactly, failed development is at most implicitly 
explained by divergence from one or other developmental state model as opposed to 
close examination of such failures themselves from within the broader application of 
the DSP itself. 
 
 For the political school, there has been much less single-minded pre-
occupation with those developmental states that have succeeded, with the attempt to 
tease out the surrounding conditions explaining why appropriate policies could be 
adopted rather than being subverted by special (non-developmental) interests derived, 
normally, from the economy but also potentially from civil society. Recall that the 
rationale underlying the gathering of case studies is to identify where the state is able 
to act independently and/or even to have an interest of its own. Indeed, initially, the 
presence of a developmental state (as reflected in MITI for Japan for example) was 
taken as sufficient evidence of the required state autonomy. But, obviously, this does 
not probe very deeply into the social, political, cultural and ideological circumstances 
that both create such pre-conditions and allow them to prevail over other causal 
factors and interests. The search, again within an inductive framework, was mounted 
for the sources of what became known as relative and/or embedded autonomy30 – a 
growing recognition for the paradigm that the state had to be both independent of, and 
yet, responsive to and controlling of other structures, processes and agents “in thick 
social relationships with various institutions of society”, Khondker (2008, p. 36). This 
seems to be a matter of bringing back in what has been left out from the state when 
previously bringing it back in as an autonomous agent! 
 
 Not surprisingly, the more case studies of relative, embedded autonomy were 
addressed, the more (refined) conditions, or their absence, were found to be of 
relevance. The literature has offered attention to consensus, institutions, political 
participation, authoritarianism, inclusion and exclusion, the international 
environment, bureaucratic cohesion, depoliticisation, weakness and strength, efficacy, 
adaptability, networks, politics in all of its forms (leadership choice, regime 
maintenance, and interaction between economic performance and coalition 
formation), and social structure comprising class, gender, ethnicity, culture and 
religion.31 In this respect, at least for the political school, the paradox is that limitation 
to political capacity to deliver developmental policy has lead to unlimited scope of 
case studies to incorporate both successes and failures.  
 
The difference with the economic school, and its tendency to shy away from 
failure, despite a common inductive methodology, is explained by the extent to which 
much state failure in economic policy cannot in and of itself be readily distinguished 
from the instances of success from within the economic school as both breach with 
the dogma of relying exclusively upon the market – as it were, where does 
developmentalism end and rent-seeking and corruption take over? By contrast, 
because it does not look at the economy as such, and takes the distinction between 
successful developmental states and unsuccessful states as starting point, the political 
school can round up the evidence across as many states as it chooses, and across as 
many variables likewise, and seek to discover empirical regularities in the 
determination of success or not. In this, it has some sort of advantage over the 
economic school which can only, for example, insist that some degree of protection is 
essential for developmental success but cannot guarantee it. On the other hand, the 
results of the political school are far from solid and are unable to offer simple 
nostrums around the relationship between authoritarianism, say, and 
developmentalism. There are also too many variables that can be added to the 
unpicking of relative, embedded autonomy, and there seems no fixed interactions 
between them, although the results swing towards democracy against authoritarianism 
as we move forward in time (in line with more progressive stances along the lines that 
equality is good for growth, etc). But, by being more rounded than the economic 
school in addressing state success and failure, the political school becomes vulnerable 
to being outflanked by a literature that addresses the same issue whilst totally ignoring 
the DSP, precisely as good governance, institutional analysis, etc, come to the fore, 
not least with the desire to identify and explain the African dummy for poor 
performance for example, Jerven (2011). 
 
 The limitation to successful developmental states, most notably for the 
economic school (other than in critique of the rest as relying too heavily upon neo-
liberal prescriptions, something that need not arise for the political school more 
concerned with internal politics and external influences upon it), has inevitably 
involved a self-limitation with regional bias towards East Asia as the preferred area of 
application of the developmental state paradigm. Africa, for example, is notable for 
the relative absence of corresponding case studies, Mkandawire (2001). But, surely, if 
interventionist policy is able to explain success in East Asian NICs by adoption of the 
right interventionist policies, it ought equally to be able to explain failure elsewhere 
by their lack of adoption or of the wrong policies. The point here, and it will recur 
across other issues around the self-limiting scope of the DSP, is to question to what 
does the approach apply, how wide is its explanation, does it explain success as well 
as failure and, is this a matter of self-confinement in its causal principles or analytical 
framework or not. For simple propositions concerning the necessity of state 
intervention because markets do not work perfectly seem to be extremely wide in 
application, more or less without limit, as opposed to being confined to developmental 
success alone (and within particular regions of the globe). And, by the same token, the 
concerns of the political school around the conditions which allow for efficacy in state 
intervention (whatever that might be in practice) are also not confined to accounts of 
developmental success in particular parts of the world for particular phases of 
development, especially in large-scale statistical cross-country exercises as opposed to 
more informal individual case studies for which choice of success over failure 
continues to loom large even for the political school. 
 
 Not surprisingly, given its emphasis on East Asian NICs, and the particular 
phase in the process of development attached to latecomer, catch-up industrialisation, 
the DSP has been drawn to assess industrial policy at the expense of other policy and 
aspects of the process of development and even of other stages of development 
including those of industrialisation itself other than latecomer catch-up. Most 
obviously absent is the role of agriculture, in and of itself, and as a crucial catalyst to 
industrialisation as a source of surplus for investment thereby alleviating savings 
constraints, labour for industrial employment, demand for domestically produced 
industrial goods, and measures to enhance productivity of agriculture itself. The same 
applies to the role of other primary products in development not least oil. As Ikpe 
(2011) argues in seeking to extend the DSP to Nigeria (as a failed instance):32  
 
Developmental states are expected to address the noted constraints on 
industrialisation by: 
 
 managing savings constraints by extensively taxing the agricultural sector; 
and manipulating foreign exchange rates with regard to agricultural exports;  
 alleviating marketed surplus constraints by adopting policies to appropriate 
food from producers at low prices; obliging producers to pay for land and 
inputs and credit repayments in food; making widespread efforts to raise 
agricultural output and productivity levels through investment in 
infrastructure, including irrigation and provision of subsidised inputs; and 
protecting the domestic agricultural sector from foreign competition; 
 limiting industrial demand constraints by ensuring the protection of the 
domestic industrial sector from foreign competition; and pursuing agricultural 
investments to enhance agricultural output and supporting pluriactivity to 
improve agricultural incomes; and 
 mitigating labour constraints by locating industrial activity in rural areas to 
enable pluriactivity; investing in rural infrastructure and social services 
including education to enable rural industrial activity as well as preparing the 
rural workforce for industrial employment; and driving investment in land and 
labour saving technology to ease the outflow of labour from agriculture.  
 … and strengthening the agricultural sector by ensuring fiscal linkages 
between agriculture and mineral resources by enabling fiscal transfers to the 
former for rural infrastructural developments, provision of subsidised inputs 
and credits to producers.  
 
It is, of course, not accidental that such considerations derive from seeking to extend 
and strain the DSP to incorporate the classic concerns of the old development 
economics. And, by the same token, whilst there are extensive literatures on both 
agriculture and development (not least for the successful developmental states), this 
does not tend to have been incorporated into the DSP itself. 
 
 This discussion offers the following lessons for LDCs insofar as they seek to 
become or, more exactly, aspire to learn from the experiences of erstwhile (East 
Asian) developmental states either from their golden periods of industrialisation or 
from those foundational periods that preceded them.33 First and foremost is the need 
to focus state policy on agriculture (and other primary sectors) to bring about 
productivity increase for which leaving the sector to the market to exploit comparative 
advantage and be disciplined by competitive forces is totally inadequate. Second, this 
must be targeted as both a goal and a means to development. Third, as already 
indicated to some extent, corresponding policy for agriculture will dovetail with the 
classically conceived challenges of development in which the state plays a significant 
role across expanding food and raw material supply, creating a surplus for investment, 
surplus labour for transfer to other sectors, and surplus product for export to earn 
foreign exchange, and creating both supply and demand linkages for sectors serving 
agriculture (fertiliser, seeds, etc) and served by it (food processing). Fourth, the range 
of potential policies involved are extensive and their suitability and potential highly 
complex and diverse, and contingent upon crop, climate, land quality and location, 
and potential for mix of products (by quality and for domestic or export markets), 
infrastructural provision (transport, irrigation, etc), potential for land reform, 
integration or not into global (or domestic) value chains, traditional patterns of work 
and consumption, and so on. In this light, as amply confirmed by the overview of 
Chang (2009) the task is to identify the appropriate policies for agriculture to be 
developmental drawing upon a wealth of historical and continuing experience rather 
than seeking to emulate some elusive market-led route to efficiency. Whilst Chang is 
mainly concerned with policy for raising agricultural productivity in light of historical 
and continuing experience, similar considerations apply to, and inevitably mix in 
with, achieving the broader developmental goals associated with industrialisation. On 
the basis of case studies, and broader overview, it is found that the state can play a 
significant role in relation to land tenure, land degradation, either over-fragmentation 
or over-concentration of landholdings, agricultural research, extension services, rural 
credit, irrigation, transport, fertilizers, seeds, price and income stabilities, trade 
shocks, agro-processing, marketing, electrification and education.34 Last, then, and by 
no means least, and as suggested implicitly by extension of the political school 
attached to the DSP, there is no avoiding the politics of agriculture and the complex of 
interests and public and private, national and international, institutions with which 
such politics is embroiled. These range from the multinational biotechnology 
corporations down through more or less wealthy landowners and tenants to landless, 
casualised wage-labourers.  
 
 Indeed, the formation, implementation and monitoring with feedback of policy 
must be sensitive to the structures and processes through which these interests are 
formed and exert influence and, equally, how they interact with the emergence and/or 
strengthening of new constituencies as development proceeds, or not. It is also 
essential to be mindful of the speed and unexpected directions that might be taken as 
oil-rich middle east economies (and China) buy up agricultural land in developing 
countries (especially in Africa) to address their own food sustainability (and, of more 
longstanding duration, the displacement of agricultural production for domestic 
production for cash crop production for western European luxury and/or all-year 
consumption). 
 
 Significantly, in light of these issues, it is indicative that the International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, Technology for Development 
(IAASTD) recommended broad conclusions and mixed methods of analysis for 
dealing with the diversity and complexities of food supply.35 And even the World 
Bank, which has tended to neglect agriculture except for the occasional blitzed focus 
from one decade to the next, finds it difficult, if not impossible, to specify one policy 
fits all on targets and instruments for agricultural policy even though it does have an 
ethos of favouring private property rights, minimal state intervention, and the 
promotion of multinational corporation interests as suppliers to, and customers for, 
agriculture.36 
 
 And much the same is true of closer consideration of different stages of 
industrial development themselves other than that of latecomer catch-up. The 
exception in this respect is the “flying geese” approach. This has two aspects. On the 
one hand are the dynamic linkages from one sector to another with potentially 
increasing degree of technical sophistication and value added as we move through the 
flock. Here, once again, there have been limitations by taking the Washington 
Consensus as point of departure. For the neo-liberal reliance upon getting the prices 
right, perceiving the state as a source of corruption and rent seeking, and denying its 
capacity to pick and promote winners, induced corresponding counterclaims on these 
terms alone. Consequently, the result was also not only to focus upon industrial policy 
but also to frame it in a narrow way, straying little beyond trade policy, preferential 
access to finance, and coordination and promotion of investment within and across 
sectors. But this tends to leave a number of vital elements of industrial policy (or 
factors within industrial policy) out of the picture – such as skills and the labour 
market, the role of the financial system more generally than directed finance, and 
technology policy.37 These seem more or less to have been assumed to fall into place 
by virtue of other policies as prime movers.  
 
On the other hand, “flying geese” serves to highlight the shifting international 
division of labour between, or across, national economies as those at lower levels of 
development and wages and skills take on the relocated manufacturing roles of those 
already upgrading or upgraded to higher stages of industrialisation. The classic case is 
Japan’s investment strategy into the Asia-Pacific Rim in the last decades of the 
twentieth century although China currently presents a more complex picture as it both 
leads the geese of follower nations and competes with them. This and closer 
examination of historical experience in terms of, or increasingly at the expense of the 
metaphor adopted, suggests questioning whether geese fly in a two-dimensional V-
shaped pattern or formation alone, and might not other birds or creatures either join 
the flock and even challenge hierarchy within it. Otherwise is to suggest a limited 
form of technological determinism that strains both the evidence and the potential for 
policies that breach with, or progress beyond, confinement to latecomer catch-up that 
preserves the existing order in the international division of labour, ones that have 
indeed been broken by the East Asian NICs in the past, with China possibly ready to 
repeat the exercise in its own fashion.38 
 
 Thus, certainly, labour-intensive industries in the first instance can then form 
the basis for a “flying geese” pattern of upgrading into linked higher value, skilled 
and more capital-intensive production, Shafaeddin (2005, p. 1153) and Haque (2007, 
p. 6).39 What will mark the (success of the) earlier stages of such processes is the 
extent and sustainability of markets against volatility and competition. This means 
both a premium on export markets, and on domestic production for domestic markets 
deploying domestic resources. The latter can neatly dovetail with the provision of a 
number of basic needs. But it remains essential to acknowledge that such stylised 
forms of progress may not be the only ones, and must be subjected to investigation as 
such, even if they were the only options available, in order to identify shifting 
potential in light of technological imperatives and domestic and global market and 
other economic and social conditions. 
 
 This is also, however, to raise the issue of global factors both logically and 
analytically. Not all can catch up otherwise there would never be leaders despite the 
pressures towards gaining and sustaining technological advance. Indeed, much of the 
DSP’s latecomer catch-up perspective not only neglects earlier stages of 
industrialisation but also the later stage of being on the frontier itself (as if once at the 
finishing line, the story is over). That this is not so simple or automatic is evidenced 
by Japan’s industrial travail’s over the past two decades, whilst the record of the East 
Asian NICs more generally of getting beyond the frontier remains mixed, contingent 
on the nature of the technologies, consumer products and the strategies of incumbents 
(the original geese).40  
 
 And as mentioned, the closely studied impact of China is also relevant in and 
of itself as well as being indicative of a much more widely dispersed sources of origin 
and sectors for application for direct foreign investment from multinational 
corporations and corresponding countries of origin for such investment (with such 
investment previously heavily dominated by the USA with the UK significant but far 
behind in second place). Thus, the increasing spread of sources of foreign direct 
investment is indicative both of enhanced opportunities (availability of, and 
competition between, sources) and of the erosion of potential for national 
developmental strategies insofar as there is dependence on global value 
chains/networks.  
 
 But for China itself, there are both lessons and impact to be assessed on which 
there are burgeoning literatures. Here, a few simple assertions are offered from this 
literature.41 First, in the past, Chinese economic development has been primarily 
based on rapidly expanding domestic markets. This has been accompanied by 
relatively rapid growth in labour productivity, contingent upon very high levels of 
investment and has given rise to increasing real wages and the emergence even of 
shortages for skilled labour. 
 
 Second, export growth has been of increasing importance more recently, with 
corresponding widening of China’s trade surplus, but this has been more associated 
with lower levels of wages, for employment in sectors attached to foreign direct 
investment, particularly geared towards the processing trade. Whilst this has been 
large enough at least to account for China’s total trade surplus, its contribution to 
value added is no more than 5% of Chinese GDP, more or less conforming to an 
enclave-type economy, typically found across multinational corporation activity 
across the world within export-processing zones, etc. But this should not be taken as 
typical of, nor predominant in, the Chinese economy and its success. 
 
 Third, the dependence of China upon banks for finance for industrial 
investment is staggering. As Carney (2009) reveals, it is proportionately roughly four 
times higher than for the United States, and at least double that of most other 
countries. This is, however, indicative of the limited extent of financialisation of the 
Chinese economy, since finance has derived primarily from state-owned banks that 
have been policy driven. Of course, this does not guarantee developmental success in 
the absence of other conditions but these are precisely what have been present in 
China where, nonetheless, development is fraught by the tensions associated with 
sustaining international competitiveness and domestic economic and social stability. 
 
 Fourth, this is indicative of the much more extensive reliance of China upon 
policies that have totally broken from the Washington Consensus in general and those 
for transition economies in particular, where the outcomes by comparison with 
Eastern Europe are salient.42 Significantly, for a short period, China did succumb to 
Washington Consensus style policies in the mid-1990s but, as a matter of pragmatism 
in wake of the crisis this induced, it immediately abandoned them for policies of 
Keynesian expansionism led by welfare provision, a renewal of the role of the state 
sector, and reversal of foreign sector liberalisation.  
 
 Fifth, in this light, it is hardly surprising that a very wide spectrum of opinion 
from across different positions regarding the sources of China’s success and its 
responsibility, or not, for prompting, aggravating or ameliorating the current crisis, 
have some common positions on how it should proceed – by expanding domestic 
production to serve both higher wages and higher levels of social provision, and 
reducing the overall level of domestic investment as a proportion of GDP. Indeed, 
such postures are in line with those being adopted by China itself.43 
 
 Nonetheless, sixth, myths do prevail concerning China and its role in the 
world economy. These tend to originate from an ethos of blame either incorrectly 
specifying factors or their causal roles in response to problems that derive other than 
from China itself. These include the idea of a global saving glut, unreasonable trade 
surplus and competitiveness from too low an exchange rate, and China’s export 
growth at the expense of domestic consumption. In contrast, it should be emphasised 
that China’s success or impact in these terms, properly interpreted, can only be of 
considerable benefit to the world economy (as well as its own) although the incidence 
of such benefits are uneven and possibly negative for some. Failure to realise these 
benefits is no fault of China and that they do not accrue for other, unrelated reasons, 
of which financialisation elsewhere is clearly culpable, is no reason to displace blame 
onto China. 
 
 More specifically, as far as China might serve as an enabling factor in the 
promotion of developmental states elsewhere, its size and diversity give rise to a 
complex mix of complementary opportunities and sources of competition. Inevitably, 
these are variously spread across different countries, at different stages of 
development, across different sectors, technological capabilities and levels of value-
added, and corresponding position within global value chains/networks, Kaplinsky 
(2008) on sub-Saharan Africa for example. Across the literature more generally, the 
levels of uncertainty and unevenness involved is conducive to appeal to metaphor as 
China is variously understood as “Engine, Conduit, or Steamroller?”, Haltmaier et al 
(2007), or as a perpetrator of “Flying Geese or Sitting Ducks”,  Ahearne et al (2006). 
For Haltmaier et al (2007) in particular, China offers large, growing and varied 
markets (including its own growing foreign tourism), as well as competition in own 
domestic and third party markets for other countries. And it is a conduit for regional 
manufacture and assembling of goods across internationally fragmented production 
processes and markets and, p. 25: 
 
As China has moved up the value chain in recent years, increasing its presence 
in electronic high-tech exports in particular, there have also been shifts in the 
pattern of production in the other economies in the region. For instance, Japan 
and Korea have further increased their presence in the medium-tech 
automotive industry and Singapore has developed its biomedical sector. At the 
same time, the Philippines has increased its revealed comparative advantage in 
exports of electronic high-tech products, a large proportion of which are parts 
and components. However, our analysis of product displacement suggests that 
China’s increasing export share has not reduced export growth for the other 
countries in the high-tech industries, although it has had a negative effect in 
the medium-tech and low-tech industries. 
 
Further, though, the following implications are drawn, with the first proposition no 
doubt being tested much earlier than could have been anticipated:44 
 
First, although China’s rise as an economic powerhouse is undisputed, at this 
point it is unlikely that emerging Asia could weather a significant slowdown in 
the U.S. economy, for example, without being noticeably affected. Second, 
our results on displacement of exports and changes in product mix of exports 
suggest that for some countries the rising trade in parts and components may 
be an endogenous response to competition from China, as these countries try 
to find areas of complementarity with China rather than compete head-to-
head. Third, China’s impact on the economies of the region is not uniform. 
 
And they continue, “Finally it should be emphasized that the debate on these issues is 
still evolving (the present paper included) and is difficult to settle. Additional research 
is needed”.  
 
 Similarly, Ahearne et al (2006, pp. 2-3) point to the varied manners in which 
global production is organised, possibly allowing for complementary patterns of 
growth: 
 
As an example of how vertical integration might make export growth rates 
similar, take the example of a small electronic device like a DVD player. The 
manufacturing of some components—e.g., motherboards, memory, etc.—
might be handled in one or several of the ASEAN economies or the NIEs. 
Those components are then exported to, say, China, where they are assembled 
into the DVD player. The DVD player is then shipped out to its final 
destination. Several economies in the region might thus provide value-added 
to a single device. Hence, as demand for DVD players fluctuates, one would 
expect export growth to be positively correlated across economies. 
 
However, they add, p. 14: 
 
When one looks at the sectoral data on U.S. imports from Asia, there is no 
doubt that China is displacing other Asian economies across a wide spectrum 
of markets. Not all of this displacement is symptomatic of competition. First, a 
significant portion of the final assembly of Asian-made products takes place in 
China. 
 
And, further complicating matters, they observe that, “to some extent the changes in 
trade shares reflect a longer-term trend of China moving into the product space 
vacated by the Asian NIEs as they move to higher value-added products”, p. 14, but 
also quoting McKinnon and Schnab (2006), who suggest yet another role around 
intra- and inter-regional assembly for which, “China is merely the face of a worldwide 
export surge into American consumer markets”, p. 15. 
 
Here, given the diverse and shifting roles to be played by China, it is necessary 
to be mindful of the most recent lessons to be drawn from the Japanese experience. 
Prior to the emergence of China, it was seen as driving the Asian region and, with it, 
the potential for developmental states to emerge, Chia (2007) for example. Its own 
malaise over the past two decades, and its turn towards a new “industrial policy” 
based on infrastructure and social welfare, possibly to be reinforced by the tragic 
consequences of the tsunami, is a telling testimony not only of the need for continuing 
research in and of itself but because of how rapidly circumstances can change. And as 
a result, as Haltmaier et al (2007, pp. 25-6) suggest, “In particular, acquiring a more 
detailed understanding of the country-specific responses to the rapid emergence of 
China would be a fruitful line of further inquiry”.  
 
More generally, the DSP might paint too rosy a picture of what will be 
attempted, and what can be achieved at the national level in light of neoliberal 
globalisation and the constraints that this imposes. The extent to which these 
constraints prevail, in or out of global crisis, is yet to be tested and depends upon how 
it is addressed at both global and national (and other) levels.45 For Hayashi (2010), for 
example, this means that neo-liberal globalisation has not undermined the potential 
for developmental states.46 Indeed, far from being outdated, they are necessary in 
order to integrate into the world economy, rather than protect from it, p. 62: 
 
the developmental state is a model of state-led industrialization for developing 
countries, where the market mechanism is underdeveloped or the market itself 
does not exist. The underdevelopment (or nonexistence) of the market means 
that the market does not signal which industries should grow or disappear. 
Under the circumstances, the government should be more proactive than just 
leaving any economic activity to the market: the government should identify 
which industries should be targeted and actually promote such industries. 
However, the means to promote particular industries do not have to equate to 
trade protectionism. Southeast Asian countries have implemented state-led 
industrialization by utilizing MNCs, and have been successfully upgrading 
their economic structure through FDI. Their experience provides an important 
insight when considering future strategies that today’s developing countries 
could pursue. 
 
This stands in sharp contrast to developmental state agnostics, not least Pirie (2012) 
who argues that the prospects for successful industrial policy on a broad and national 
front are limited by virtue of first-comer advantages of competitors and the scale of 
domestic markets that would need to be available to be able to compete even if 
protection were a viable policy option. The alternative is offered of national 
promotion of social provision as some insulation from global dominance.47 Yet, the 
burden of these arguments surely depends upon the nature of the sectors concerned, 
how they are or can be organised and integrated nationally and internationally, and 
how domestic and international interests are forged and realised. This suggests the 
need to finesse a number of (false) dualisms – reformism versus revolution; nation-
state versus globalisation; state versus market; and democracy versus 
authoritarianism, and so on, each of which can only fit uncomfortably within the DSP 
itself as traditionally posed.  
 
Yet, over the most recent period, the DSP has experienced a limited revival, to 
some degree stretching beyond the limitations previously highlighted here but without 
regaining the prominence previously enjoyed as a leading form of critique of the 
Washington Consensus. But it has done so in a way that tends to depart from its 
original ethos of examining the systemic role of the state in bringing about 
development (conceived as latecomer catch-up development). Instead, scope of 
application has been extended by incorporating any positive role played by the state 
as evidence of presence of a developmental state. First, for example, especially but 
not exclusively through the South Korean experience, the DSP has attracted renewed 
attention. Reports of its death have been taken to be exaggerated as the Asian crisis 
and its preconditions and aftermath have neither entirely dismantled state intervention 
but nor has the latter been detached from the influence of the chaebol, with 
corresponding consequences for the nature and depth of recession and speed and 
extent of recovery.48 Consequently, different but continuing state intervention of 
different types, in different circumstances, and under different influences, lead the 
DSP to be invoked once more, with emphasis upon continuing state intervention to 
support both industrial and financial restructuring and the relations between them. 
After all, both state and development are involved, and so more or less casually 
constructed descriptors are deployed to resurrect the developmental state. Thus, for 
Chu (2009), there is a “reconfigured developmental state”, geared towards the 
knowledge economy, in which “Korea remains inclined towards development and 
does so by serving as a leader and an arbitrator of interests. In seeking to attain its 
development goals, the Korean state articulates visions and deploys public resources 
to structure the market and shape innovation,” p. 291 and see also Lim (2010) and 
Lee, K-S. (2009), and Lee and Kwak (2009) for a comparative account of South 
Korea and Japan.  
 
Wider afield, Kuriyan and Ray (2009), in an account of ICT industries in 
India, perceives public-private partnerships as a form of developmental state and, in a 
sophisticated analysis of the Tema port in Ghana, Chalfin (2010, p. 580) concludes 
that, emphasis added: 
 
The result is a port dominated by what can be described as a neo(-liberal) 
developmental state maintaining select features of an earlier statism rooted in 
the expansion of bureaucratic oversight and the protection of national interests 
and market share, now repurposed in line with a neo-liberal agenda focused on 
trade facilitation, multinational corporate advantage, and financial speculation. 
 
The counterposing of neo-liberal with developmental state is striking but raises the 
question of just how far the two can be accommodated with one another, conceptually 
and in practice.  
 
 Second, as suggested, the DSP has now come to serve as a blanket term for 
any circumstance in which there is state involvement and some aspect of 
development.49 This also allows a certain promiscuity in forging relations between the 
DSP and other paradigms. For Yeung (2009), the development state is situated in 
relation to global production networks and regional integration; Gomez (2009) 
incorporates firm organisation by appeal to Chandler’s approach to big business; 
Kwon and Yi (2009) and Kwon (2009) address poverty reduction and international 
policy transfer, respectively; Eimer and Lutz (2010) offers a comparative study of 
HIV/AIDS drugs policy across India and Brazil; Aiyede (2009) questions whether 
federalism can overcome predatory fragmentation; and de Haan (2010) is concerned 
with corruption, clientelism, patronage, resource curse, and rent-seeking, p.109:50 
 
So neo-patrimonial states do not have to democratize, liberalize and outlaw 
corruption before they can become developmental states. But their political-
administrative elites do have to feel a need—because of political pressure 
from society—to engage in a social contract for economic growth with their 
population instead of just engaging in a redistribution system of state revenues 
based on patronage and a fat bank account abroad. 
 
Interestingly, such a prognosis within the political school is entirely without roots 
within particular economic activities at whatever stage of development.  
 
The DSP is, in principle, and to some degree then in practice, of universal 
applicability. Further, such widening of the scope of the approach is also unsurprising 
as those who are newly, or continue to be, attached to it, seek to find new avenues for 
their research. Mok (2007), Green (2007) and Gopinathan (2007) are concerned with 
the developmental state and (higher) education as East Asian NICs have responded to 
crisis; Neo (2007) with the environment; and Fritz and Menocal (2007), Sindzingre 
(2007), and Randall (2007) with aid, taxation and political parties, respectively. And 
industrial policy also benefits from a broader perspective, as Park (2007) examines 
the treatment of SMEs, Lazonick (2008) is mindful of entrepreneurship, Lee and Tee 
(2009) take on cluster analysis for the bio-medicine in Singapore, and Bowen (2007) 
weds global production networks to aircraft manufacture in the Asia-Pacific Rim.51 
 
And, third, as in the past, newly emerging developmental states provide the 
raw material for further contributions, not least with China’s economic miracle to the 
fore.52 What is more novel is the goal of identifying developmental states in the 
making. This is true of the hopes placed for a new developmental state on more 
progressive governments in Latin America, Moudud and Botchway (2008) and 
Caldentey (2008), as well as on Africa, Matlosa (2007) and Moudud and Botchway 
(2007). Barbara (2008, p. 311) views post-conflict states as potentially developmental 
since, “The economic environments of failed states provide extreme examples of 
market failure”. And, in a bizarre way, developmental state optimism takes extreme 
form after a decade or more of neo-liberalism, with the self-declaration of post-
apartheid South Africa as a prospective candidate, all evidence to the contrary Fine 
(2010c) and Ashman et al (2010). This is ironic given that most developmental states 
were, at least initially, blissfully unaware of their status as such whilst experiencing, 
let alone anticipating, it! They needed western academics to tell them what they were 
after they had already been it. 
 
In short, the attempt to realise the goals of the DSP can potentially make a 
major contribution to the progressive transformation of global capitalism and national 
capitalisms although it does not offer a model or collection of models from which 
appropriate policy can be picked from the shelf. The DSP serves at most as a stepping 
stone that must be surpassed both analytically and strategically. But for the moment, 
at least, as neo-liberal scholarship, ideology and policy in practice remain severely 
unchallenged in the alternatives being offered in the wake of global crisis, the DSP is 





In many respects, discussion of industrial policy, especially for economists, 
has suffered a similar fate as the DSP. It has gone out of fashion. And, where it has 
clung onto survival at the margins, it has been marked and limited by its neo-liberal 
alter ego of leaving everything to the market, reducing its methods, substantive 
content and scope of application. For, the new orthodoxy (market- and institutional-
imperfections approach) around industrial policy still accepts a basic division as 
starting point between state and market, but accepts that there is a role for each, and 
that they can be complementary rather than antagonistic. Thus, for Hausman and 
Rodrik (2006, p. 25): 
 
the government is only focused on providing complementary inputs to the 
market. It is not an issue of state vs. market. If the government does not 
provide the inputs, market efficiency will be low. In this world, laissez-faire is 
a dead-end street. Instead, the ideal alternative is for the government to 
provide all the complementary inputs to all potential [market] activities. 
 
Significantly, though, with the pro-active state only making up for the deficiencies of 
the market, this is all set within an analytical framework firmly grounded upon 
microeconomic principles and corresponding market imperfections. The latter are 
general and drawn from the microeconomics that has emerged over the past two 
decades to greater prominence and without development initially in mind as an 
application. It involves universal notions of potential market failure derived from the 
presence of externalities, scale economies, informational problems and those of 
coordination, Haque (2007, p. 3) for example. And, although occasional and even 
inevitable reference is made to the macro or systemic aspects involved in 
development and industrialisation, especially in pursuit of structural change, the thrust 
of the approach is to favour the market (or globalisation) other than in piecemeal and 
selective interventions to correct market imperfections. In this respect, the limited 
departure from the Washington Consensus is striking. For the latter also offers no 
concept of development as opposed to a putative mechanism to deliver it, reliance 
upon market forces. By the same token, enhancing or complementing the market by 
piecemeal state intervention offers little more insight into the nature of development 
and industrialisation.  
 
 As a result, the Washington Consensus can be seen to have had the effect of 
narrowing down how industrial policy has been conceived, not least if ironically in 
the opposition to it, over the past decade. This has occurred on a number of levels. 
One has been, as already suggested, in the extent to which industrial policy has been 
transformed from a mechanism for systemic industrialisation and development into an 
instrument for correcting market imperfections. At a second level, what counts as 
industrial policy has been unduly circumscribed. Whilst in principle anything falling 
under the rubric of market imperfection could count as a prompt to corrective 
industrial policy, the Washington Consensus has funnelled attention into a few, 
particular directions. The most obvious and prominent has been trade policy, followed 
closely by privatisation. This does itself reflect a more longstanding feature within the 
industrial policy literature of its being subject to fashions and shifting, but limited, 
focus on particular factors – trade policy, competition policy, promotion of SMEs, 
privatisation, skills, technology, and so on. Industrial policy has tended to search out 
and hit upon either highlighted obstacles to be remedied or removed, or magic bullets 
to be targeted, with specific factors and case studies being unduly generalised. In a 
sense the Washington Consensus is an extreme case with the market as the golden 
shot, and the state as the impediment.  
 
At a third level, and by the same token, the goals of industrial policy have 
been unduly reduced to some sort of notion of (international) competitive success and 
survival as if market criteria for the firm or industry were sufficient in and of 
themselves. In the limit, market success has been taken as the ultimate and exclusive 
goal. Or such success could be understood to be an efficient and effective way to 
allow for other objectives to be pursued in principle without examining whether this 
occurs in practice (exports to earn foreign exchange are taken as sufficient in and of 
themselves without examining whether these are retained or shifted abroad for 
example). And the same neglect applies to the broader, systemic goals and drawbacks 
of development whether it be industrialisation or environmental degradation, 
respectively. 
 
Further, whilst it has now become fashionable to emphasise diversity, 
complexity and context in considering industrial policy, these are often endowed with 
a shallow content, no more than is necessary to move beyond the one model fits all 
point of departure, and one that tends to be removed from broader economic and 
social goals and the transitions associated with, and as a component part of, 
development and industrialisation themselves. Consequently, and in contrast, 
industrial policy should both elaborate broader goals than simply attaining 
competitive survival and incorporate or integrate them with other processes and 
policies. The goals and means of modernisation attached to what might be termed the 
pre-Washington Consensus, as it were, need to be reinterpreted and reformed in light 
of historical experience and the transformations to contemporary conditions.  
 
It would be a mistake, however, to see each individual contribution or all 
contributions taken collectively as simply collapsing the goals and instruments of 
industrial policy. Rather, it is more useful to recognise that there are tensions within 
the literature. As already remarked, whatever the practice, the principle underpinning 
much discussion of industrial policy is that it is necessary to correct market 
imperfections, and these are extraordinarily wide-ranging across the literature 
especially when case studies are gathered together. For these cover each and every 
aspect of industrial performance - technology, finance, markets, skills, competition, 
trade and so on. Further, as Haque (2007, p. 1) notes, “Contrary to a general 
perception – born out of the current sway of the neoliberal orthodoxy – industrial 
policy is alive and well”.  And Rodrik is cited to the effect that, “The reality is that 
industrial policies have run rampant during the last decades – and nowhere more so 
than in those economies that have steadfastly adopted the agenda of orthodox 
reform”. A literature search on the scholarship over the past few years reveals 
thousands of examples of industrial policy successfully implemented, although much 
of this both focuses upon (new) technology and is not within the mainstream 
economics literature.  
 
As mentioned, this raises questions over whether the market imperfection 
theoretical approach to industrial policy can accommodate the evidence gained from 
case study material. Consider trade policy for example. The Washington Consensus 
offers an approach in which it is advised that levels of effective protection should be 
reduced in order that developing countries should be disciplined by world prices. This 
presumes, however, that the notion of effective protection is itself well-founded, that 
it can be appropriately measured, and that a policy of reducing effective protection is 
advantageous. As summarised in Deraniyagala and Fine (2001 and 2006) by reference 
to various contributions to the literature, such propositions depend upon a series of 
wildly unrealistic assumptions ranging over there only being two sectors in the 
economy, perfect competition in all markets, full employment of resources, no intra-
affiliate trade, on which see Bhaduri (2005), no non-tradeables, no scale effects, even 
uncertainty of outcomes across sectors of different capital-intensity, and so on 
(including absence of smuggling and transfer-pricing!). 
 
Similar considerations will apply to other elements of industrial policy where 
the incidence of market imperfections are equally legion. The issue is not so much 
that this renders the Washington Consensus nirvana of the free market as otiose, as it 
does, as how to pose alternatives across a multitude of so obviously relevant factors in 
influencing industrial performance. In this light, the response from the orthodoxy that 
still favours the market is significant. For Pack and Saggi (2006, p. 267) accept the 
case for industrial policy in principle if rejecting it in practice because of the 
complexities involved, particularly in view of globalisation (as the “dominance of 
international production networks”). Indeed, “Overall, there appears to be little 
empirical support for an activist government policy even though market failures exist 
that can, in principle, justify the use of industrial policy”.  
 
In practice, however, their argument in favour of this conclusion is not drawn 
from the empirical evidence but from speculative reasoning around the capabilities of 
government, even leaving aside “the possibilities of rent-seeking”, p. 282. They 
suggest that the breadth and depth of knowledge necessary for a policymaker are too 
demanding. Indeed, “They would have to be accurately informed about an enormous 
range of complex questions, understand their relevance, and be able to accurately 
evaluate subtle differences”. They go on to list what is involved as a minimum, pp. 
281/2:53 
 
 The firms and industries that generate knowledge spillovers. 
 The firms and industries that benefit from dynamic scale economies – the 
precise path of such learning and the magnitude of the cost disadvantage at 
each stage of the learning process. 
 The sectors that have a long-term comparative advantage. 
 The size of scale economies of different firms and sectors, to facilitate 
investment coordination. 
 An ability superior to that of individual firms to learn about their potential 
competitiveness. 
 The nature and extent of capital market failures. 
 The magnitude and direction of interindustry spillovers. 
 The relative amount of learning by individual firms from others and from their 
own experience. 
 The extent to which early entrants generate benefits for future entrants. 
 The extent of heterogeneity of firms’ learning abilities. 
 Whether consumers learn the quality of a good after consuming rather than by 
inspecting it. 
 Whether firms that are trying to reduce production costs also begin a 
simultaneous effort to improve their product’s quality to obtain a better 
reputation. 
 The potential effects of FDI or international trade on coordination problems, 
including a detailed knowledge of which of tens of thousands of intermediates 
are tradable. 
 A forecast of which firms can create new knowledge and discover better 
production methods. 
 The spillover effects of FDI and the likely intensity of foreign purchase of 
domestic intermediates. 
 
The conclusion drawn is that no state is capable of meeting these demands and, 
paradoxically, doubts are cast on whether the private (consulting) sector could do it 
either, “Quite apart from the dangers of optimal policy being subverted by industries 
and firms that would benefit, the sheer knowledge and skill requirements would 
exceed that possessed by almost any institution, including the best consulting firms”.  
 
 Through this prism, it is remarkable that any development continues to take 
place at all, given that the same demands will have to be met by the private sector in 
the absence of the state. In effect, this is simply the argument about the state being 
unable to create or pick winners raised to a higher and more detailed level. These and 
other demands upon the state in making industrial policy have to be assessed against 
goals, what would happen otherwise and what can be achieved rather than denying 
“that government officials might be this omniscient”. What is interesting here, then, is 
less the dogma of relying upon the market – even on its own terms, the issues raised 
do not lead to this conclusion – as the acknowledgement of the complexity and 
diversity of considerations to be broached by the state. Strikingly, the laissez-faire 
argument has shifted from one of the free market being a simplistic choice against the 
alternative of the state, to one of being the only satisfactory way to deal with the 
complexity of market and other choices. 
 
 Yet, those more favourable to state intervention to promote industry do not 
depart substantially from a similar conclusion. For Hausman and Rodrik (2006, p. 25), 
as noted above, the ideal is for the state to intervene perfectly to complement the 
market. It cannot do so for two reasons. First is because “it is unaffordable. The 
government cannot address all potential infrastructure needs or fix all the standards 
and rules affecting all existing and potential economic activities. It would overwhelm 
its financial, managerial and political resources”. Second, “the list of interventions is 
unknowable ex ante. Institutions and markets co-evolve and this implies that 
transaction costs and problems will be revealed as new transactions appear and new 
markets develop. Solutions have to fit the specifics of the context. This may be the 
reason why there is such an enormous variability of institutional arrangements across 
industrial countries”. As a result, Hausman and Rodrik recommend that the state limit 
itself to providing the framework within which the private sector can best seek out the 
way forward, a process of enhancing what they term “self-discovery” in another 
paper, Hausman and Rodrik (2003). Analytically, then, there is very little to 
distinguish Hausman and Rodrik from Pack and Saggi. One is  just a little more state-
friendly than the other in supporting the private sector, and arbitrarily so in denying a 
more extensive intervention because it cannot be perfect. Indeed, emphasis on 
correcting static market imperfections has given way to a parallel universe in which a 
neo-Austrian commitment to the free market as a recipe for innovation is 
complemented by some degree of state support to facilitate that innovation or path of 
discovery.54  
 
 Interestingly, part of the argument of Hausman and Rodrik is that, empirically, 
there is no consistent relation between comparative advantage based on factor 
endowments and patterns of production and trade. This is because they see 
comparative advantage as evolving over time in a path-dependent way, using the 
analogy of a monkey jumping from tree to tree in a dense forest, with the result that 
outcomes depend upon differing co-evolving institutional arrangements. But this all 
points to a much deeper conclusion to the effect that either comparative advantage is a 
tautology (you are competitive in what you are competitive) or it has no analytical 
purchase (there are no underlying and fixed determinants of industrial performance 
such as factor endowments). As Hausman and Rodrik rightly argue, this renders 
industrial development to be context specific. But their understanding of context, as 
well as path dependence, is relatively limited depending upon a monkey-forest 
analogy at one extreme and co-evolving institutions and markets at the other. Whilst 
this marks a welcome and explicit shift away from the one model fits all associated 
with the earlier Washington Consensus, with emphasis placed upon piecemeal 
correction of institutional and market imperfections, this shift is itself both piecemeal 
and insufficient in remaining heavily marked both by its origins within mainstream 
economics and by taking the Washington Consensus as point of departure. In a sense, 
the new approach, which claims both universal applicability and wide consent, might 
be dubbed a “one model of one model does not fill all”. Significantly, as already 
observed, Rodrik’s own recent collection of essays is entitled, One Economics, Many 
Recipes, emphasis added, and Hausman and Rodrik (2006) see “Industrial Policy as 
Predicament”. 
 
 Corresponding limitations in approach can be seen from a different 
perspective, and from what is in general a different literature, one more concerned 
with understanding and reflecting upon industrial policy in practice through case 
study rather than speculative reasoning. This immediately confronts the problem of 
providing a definition of industrial policy. As Välilä (2008, p. 101) puts it, “It is 
difficult to define industrial policy unambiguously ... Against this background, it is 
hardly surprising that the quest for a common definition of industrial policy is often 
abandoned in favour of a looser delineation of the concept or even in favour of 
outright agnosticism … ‘Industrial policy’ is the label that has come to be used to 
describe a wide-ranging, ill-assorted collection of micro-based supply-side initiatives 
which are designed to improve market performance in a variety of occasionally 
mutually inconsistent ways. Even in the absence of a universally agreed definition, 
industrial policy has nevertheless been recognised as a distinct area of economic 
policy in its own right, so there has to be a way to characterise it, if not define it”. At 
one extreme, as already suggested, there have been fashions in which particular 
policies have come in and out of favour as definitions of industrial policy. This 
suggests that a more comprehensive definition would gather these together as a 
composite set of policies that might be used to promote industry.55  
 
The result is to move close to, but not as far as the opposite extreme to single 
policies, in which industrial policy is perceived to be synonymous with any policy 
that affects the performance of industry. As Lin and Monga (2011b, p. 304) put it: 
 
It is useful to start by stressing that every country in the world, intentionally or 
not, pursues industrial policy … This is surprising only if one forgets that 
industrial policy broadly refers to any government decision, regulation or law 
that encourages ongoing activity or investment in a particular industry. 
 
In general, this is seen to be too far-ranging as almost all policies will have some 
effect on some industries. Consequently, Pelkmans (2006, p. 47) structures “policies 
(somehow) affecting industry” into two broad categories – those “NOT for industry” 
and those that are. The latter is itself then subdivided into what are still not designated 
as industrial policy (regional planning and price control, for example) and those that 
are included in a “(Wide concept of) industrial policy”, comprising three categories – 
framework aspects, and horizontal and sectoral/specific industrial policy (see below). 
Otherwise, there are intermediate definitions, as is the one favoured by Memiş and 
Montes (2008, p. 45) in following Chang (1993), “It is useful here to summarize the 
key points of this paper. Industrial policy is the application of selective government 
interventions to favour certain sectors so that their expansion benefits the productivity 
of the economy as a whole”. 
  
Not surprisingly, the conundrum surrounding what is industrial policy is 
complemented by similar doubts about how. For Välilä (2008, p. 101) “There is in 
general no public agency devoted to industrial policy, nor is there a legal framework 
for industrial policy. Second, and again in contrast with most other areas of economic 
policy, industrial policy does not have a well-identified and universally recognised set 
of goals to achieve. Industrial policy has goals, such as innovation support or 
protection of sectors in decline, but those goals change over time and from country to 
country. And finally, industrial policy does not possess a clearly identifiable tool kit 
of policy instruments that would be devoted exclusively to achieving the goals of 
industrial policy”. In similar vein, Bianchi and Labory (2006, p. 23-4) conclude that, 
“Our definition of industrial development policies implies a new view of the debate: 
what is relevant is not whether selective or functional policies are useful but what is 
the appropriate mix of measures to determine industrial development. Industrial 
development policies are programmes or strategies consisting of a variety of measures 
(both rules and capabilities), the mix of which is specific to a country’s conditions and 
historical experience”. Thus, “the ‘new’ industrial policies consist of large sets of 
measures that aim at providing the appropriate framework for industrial development 
to take place, via both the creation of firms and sectors (creation of comparative 
advantages) and the structural change of existing firms (structural change)”. And, in 
relating competition to industrial policy, Lorentzen and Møllgaard (2006, p. 130) 
conclude that, whilst “competition policy is rule-bound … By contrast, industrial 
policy can afford to be much more eclectic: what works, works … Hence there is no 
one-size-fits-all”.  
 
Across such literature, industrial policies tend to be divided into three 
categories: the horizontal which, in principle, could influence each industry, as in 
trade, competition or innovation policy; the vertical that is targeted to particular 
sectors; and the structural that are designed to promote a compositional shift in 
economic activity, either in downsizing or expanding particular sectors (although this 
might be thought to be part of, or to straddle, the other two categories), Välilä (2008, 
p. 103) for example. Especially for the first of these, there is a very large number of 
factors involved in terms of the determinants of industrial performance even in the 
narrow sense of competitive success. And each of these factors commands a rich and 
contested literature over the role of trade, competition, and innovation as well as 
finance, sources of investment, skills, labour markets, regulation, privatisation, and so 
on. By the same token, the intersection of these factors within particular sectors is 
bound to be different from one sector to another and from one country to another for 
the same sector (and across global value chains and networks). 
 
This diversity is itself complemented by two further complicating factors, both 
of which have already been raised. On the one hand, possibly reflecting the 
amorphous nature of industrial policy, it tends to be subject to a mix of policy-making 
institutions, more or less dedicated to the purpose. These range over competition 
boards, regulatory authorities, sectoral associations, quite apart from the various 
government departments and ministries. There are inevitably problems of insufficient 
powers to make policy as well as of coordination of powers where they do exist in 
policymaking. The corresponding potential for lack of instruments, goals and 
institutions in the making of industrial policy leads Välilä (2008) somewhat 
precipitously to presume that it is, or even should be, narrowed down in scope. In a 
perverse way, this point, concerning both the scope of industrial policy and its 
interaction if not inclusion with other forms of policy and policymaking, is revealed 
by the way in which international trade disputes (as one element of industrial policy) 
have spilled over into issues around unfair competition through discriminatory 
pricing, competition policy, subsidies to training and research and development, and 
so on. As it were, anything that the state does that might improve industrial 
performance is open to be deemed to be unfair in a trade dispute.  
 
On the other hand, particularly in the context of industrialisation and 
development, the goals of industrial policy need to be expanded to incorporate much 
more than competitive success (as well as questioning what success means), with 
achievement to be assessed in terms not only of growth, productivity increase, trade 
balance but also of employment generated, wages and conditions in general and 
across different socio-economic strata, skills engendered, linkages to other sectors, 
and so on.  
 
On this last point, Mackintosh et al (2007) confirm that the blinkered analysis 
of industrial policy derived from the one market model fits all has closed down the 
breadth of considered policy space. In addition, though, this has precluded 
consideration of the relationship between social sectors and industrial policy. More 
specifically, for Paci and Schweitzer (2006, p. 301), “The health sector is made up of 
a significant number of inter-connected industries that produce health services and 
manufactured goods, including pharmaceuticals and medical equipment”. They 
identify three clusters of industries: healthcare providers, financiers and 
manufacturers. This leads to the conclusion that, “Policy towards health could be 
reconsidered, in order to take account of this broad concept of the health industry, as a 
system of intertwined actors and thus also industrial policy, can be implemented in 
this field”, p. 302. It inevitably follows that there are synergies between health and 
industrial policy, and the same would apply to other elements of economic and social 
provision, including basic needs such as housing and education, as these too 
incorporate and/or are attached to industrial sectors, see next section. 
 
This all leads here to a different and novel approach to the definition of 
industrial policy, one that does not seek a more or less arbitrary general definition of 
narrower or wider scope that can be applied in specific instances. Instead, first, it 
allows for case study and policy analysis itself to identify the key areas for 
intervention although, as will be seen, this does not imply neglect of the various 
factors that inform policymaking and industrial performance. In other words, context 
and specificity is understood in a different way, to be empirically induced rather than 
imposed by choice of model and corresponding configuration of given factors. 
Perhaps, although it can also be misleading, the most appropriate analogy is with the 
idea of national culture for which general models are neither appropriate for the 
diversity within and between countries although general considerations can be 
identified. Similarly, industrial policy will have its own culture or cultures, deeply 
rooted in the economic and social history and the continuing structures, relations, 
agencies and practices within the economy and, for which, the approach associated 
with national systems of innovation offers some insight. This is because of its 
emphasis on empirically grounded attention to evolution, institutions, networks and so 
on. 
 
Second, emphasis is placed upon how the state and market are integrally 
related, especially in the context of development, and that one is not necessarily or 
simply at the expense, or even the complement, of the other. As a result, it is a matter 
of exploring the underlying factors that allow for synergy between state and market 
and how to mobilise these for development. This is recognised in the older 
development economics where industrialisation is not simply seen as structural 
change in the sense of changing composition of output but as part and parcel of a 
wider process of transition involving class relations, urbanisation, agricultural 
transition, and so on, as indicated by the admittedly heavily disputed notion of 
modernisation. 
 
Third, traditional measures and achievement of industrial success are 
important (competitiveness and productivity increase, etc) but they have to be set 
against wider goals related to economic and social development. These wider goals 
are what constitutes horizontal or strategic factors that are both the conditions and 
consequences, and hence the instruments and targets, of industrialisation. Not only 
employment generation, but what kind of employment in terms of wages and 
conditions as well as the creation of, and transformation in, labour markets forms one 
such horizontal factor. 
 
Fourth, industrial policy does need to be targeted to specific sectors and the 
location of such sectors within the economy in terms of its inputs and outputs and 
impact upon economic performance narrowly conceived (most narrowly in input-
output terms but more broadly in terms of the agents, structures and processes 
involved in provision). Such a vertical approach, however, needs to be complemented 
by a horizontal approach, incorporating the strategic requirements and contributions 
attached to industrial performance. These range over finance for investment, 
technology, skills, environment, markets, infrastructure, employment intensity and 
creation, balance of payments impact, poverty alleviation, and so on. Conversely, 
such horizontal factors need to be addressed as part and parcel of industrial policy – 
how the financial system functions, how technology and skills are to be generated and 
retained, gender, regional, environmental and other balances, and so on.  
 
Fifth, the heady and diverse mixes of horizontal and vertical factors within and 
between economies, with correspondingly different priorities and content in policies, 
is the reason why “industrial policy” as such needs to be context specific. But there is 
equally the danger of overlooking the macro or systemic functioning within which 
industrial policy and transformation is occurring. So, it is also important to take a 
view on the structure and dynamic of the economy and society within and through 
which policy is being directed in order to gauge both potential feasibility and impact.  
 
 Sixth, readily overlooked and treated as secondary, is organising the 
systematic collection of adequate data for the policy process. Without such data, it is 
neither possible to formulate policy adequately nor to monitor its effects. Further, 
government departments must have the skills and motivation to carry out the 
necessary policy work. And there must be the determination to overcome, or 
incorporate, underlying economic and political interests in formulating, implementing 
and monitoring (and providing feedback to) policy. These aspects must be carried 
forward together with, for example, data collection responding to the impact analysis 
of policy work, and policy responding to and informing monitored outcomes. 
 
 Last, and as a special instance of much that has gone before, the most recent 
financial turbulence on a global scale has revealed the extent to which the increasing 
financialisation over the past thirty years is now proving extraordinarily dysfunctional 
for economic performance in general and for industrial policy in particular. The 
impact of financial crises on industrial performance can be devastating, both more or 
less directly in collapsing market demand and finance for investment, and indirectly 
through the resources and capabilities that are gathered to shore up the financial sector 
itself at the expense of other activities and provision. In this light, careful attention 
needs to be paid to how industrial (and other policy) can be insulated from, rather than 
subordinated to, finance with testing issues to be addressed in terms of the internal 
workings of the domestic financial system and its integration into global finance.   
 
 This bears further consideration, not least because the dysfunction attached to 
financial crisis ought necessarily to raise the issue of the extent to which this is 
normal in some sense as opposed to exceptional for being particularly acute. The 
central concern must be to what extent has the rise of finance met the aims of 
economic and social development, not only in providing financial services (and 
profits) but also in generating finance for industry and for government expenditure 
more generally. And, in the realms of both policy and resource allocation, there are 
questions concerning whether the vested interests and (free market) ideology of 
finance has prevailed at the expense of other interests and stances, not least given the 
extent to which finance has currently shown itself to be excessively dependent upon 
the state to save both itself and the wider economy from collapse.  
 
 In this respect, the experience of China offers a salutary lesson in terms of the 
extent to which finance has, to a large degree, remained under central control. In 
making the contrast between China and elsewhere, Lo (2007, p. 207) suggests, “There 
is thus an intrinsic contradiction with financialization: the speculative pursuits of 
profitability tend to crowd out productive activities, therefore resulting in systemic 
demand deficiency and undermining the sources of profitability”. More generally, as 
argued in detail by Jomo (2008), the financialisation associated with neo-liberalism 
has failed to deliver on any of its putative benefits for the functioning of individual 
economies and for the global economy as a whole. Moreover, remedial measures need 
to be extensive at national and international levels. In this respect, the relatively 
recent, but now largely set aside, distinction between bank-based and market-based 
financial systems needs to be revived as well as refined and developed now that the 
previously triumphant market-based approach has been thoroughly discredited. It is a 
matter of placing finance at the service of industrial policy and investment, and of 
developmental goals more generally, and the same applies to macroeconomic policy 
(for which it is significant how huge sums of government funding can be found to 
support the financial system during a crisis whilst these were denied for health, 
education and welfare during more prosperous circumstances). Significant is the 
extent to which the East Asian NICs subordinated both finance and macro-policy to 
developmental goals rather than vice-versa. In addition, the deregulation of the 
financial system has both raised volatility and removed the mechanisms for handling 
it, other than through extremely costly holdings of foreign reserves (quite apart from 
capital flight both legal and illegal), Rodrik (2006) and Ndikumana and Boyce (2008). 
 
 Of course, finance, and corresponding financial systems across varieties of 
markets and functions, each of which will have its own country-specifics as well as 
integration with international and state finance, is just one of a number of horizontal 
or strategic factors that will need to be addressed in and of itself and in its particular 
incidence upon industrial policy in its vertical or sectoral aspects. The issues involved 
are very different in case of direct foreign investment of a multinational corporation 
as opposed to small-scale enterprises serving localised markets. And the same applies 
to the difference in the role of finance in case of primary commodity exports 
(themselves to be differentiated from agriculture through to precious metals) as 
opposed to clothing, say, or casualised and informal sectors.  
 
 For industrial policy, required across each of these horizontal factors is to 
break not only with the mantra of the Washington Consensus but also with the limited 
departure from the laissez-faire approach that has already been delineated. This entails 
an analytical departure from the market/institutional imperfection framework and a 
more extensive empirically grounded input from historical experience as begins to be 
provided by the developmental state approach. In case of direct foreign investment, 
for example, it can offer varieties of benefits from increased exports through to 
technological upgrading. But this is far from the inevitable consequence of adopting 
policies in pursuit of a spurious business-friendly environment or competing in sweet-
heart deals for investment by affiliates, Memiş and Montes (2008, p. 3). Rather, the 
accrual of benefits from direct foreign investment have to be anticipated in advance, 
not only in principle, but also through negotiation and by putting in  place the 
mechanisms and policies by which there is technological and other spill-over. 
 
 In this context, technology itself needs to be unpicked with a considerable 
degree of sophistication that goes far beyond either the pursuit or sustaining of “self-
discovery” or the more general orthodoxy that perceives technological progress as a 
shift in a production function whether through expenditure for that purpose (R&D) or 
through some induced but undervalued externality such as spill-over or learning-by-
doing. In the latter respect, the literature taken as a whole has recognised the 
complexity of what is involved, with the potential for learning not only by doing but 
also by exporting, importing, adopting, adapting, licensing and so on. This only 
begins to draw out the complexities of both the nature of technology and the causes 
and consequences of the ways in which it evolves. There are differences across 
sectors as well as in the demands between catching up in technology and moving 
beyond what is always itself an evolving technological frontier, and how each of these 
aspects fits differentially and over time into the chains of activities that comprise 
industrial linkages and interactions, see previous discussion of flying geese, etc.  
 
 The role of the state sector is also imperative. It is, after all, a large consumer 
itself and can use its purchasing power as a lever for other policies. It plays a major 
role in the provision of economic and social infrastructures, themselves a part of, or 
heavily linked to, industry. The marked shift away from the dogma of privatisation is, 
in terms of perceiving the state as supporting the private sector to deliver and 
responsible for improving conditions of competition and regulation, sorely inadequate 
as the backdrop and basis for industrial policy. Taken together, there is no guarantee 
that what is generally the limited scope of interventions that can be made by trade, 
competition and regulation authorities is sufficient to generate sufficient levels of 
investment, appropriate technologies, skills and welfare of the workforce, and so on. 
The issue is, however, not simply to counterpose state versus private enterprise - the 
commanding heights versus the free market or somewhere in between – but to 
formulate strategic and sectoral goals and examine how they might best be achieved, 
in which the incidence of form of ownership is just one part. In this respect, it may be 
necessary to reform the institutions for making industrial policy so that the allocation 
and coordination of responsibilities across government departments is rationalised and 
coherent. Specific sectors may require their own authorities rather than relying upon 
the government departments set up for general purposes, to bring together and 
integrate the various elements involved such as training, technology, investment 
levels, pricing, and so on, Fine (1998a) for a telling example drawn from South 
African steel whose prognoses have been borne out. 
  
 And, apart from being a consumer, the state is a filter and funnel for many 
other policy goals that should be accommodated by industrial policy, whether as 
intermediate targets (such as export earnings), meeting basic needs, reducing poverty 
and inequality, etc. Some form of social cost-benefit needs to be made to inform 
policymaking, but there is no reason to presume that the weights given to objectives 
should remain constant over time or across different horizontal or vertical issues (as a 
big push might be made for skills or health from time to time). Nor is it the case that 
the enhancement of employment and working conditions must be at the expense of 
other goals otherwise, of course, the more developed countries would have even 
worse such conditions than the developing! As found in Sri Lanka, for example, the 
consequences of labour repression, in pursuit of wage reduction and undermining of 
trade unions, can be counterproductive by precluding the potential for orderly 
collective bargaining and prompting economic and social disruption in its place. As 
Teitelbaum (2007, p. 830) puts it: 
 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Sri Lankan government adopted a labour-
repressive export-oriented strategy of development … repression of private 
sector unions during this period destroyed the legitimacy of traditional left 
unions and the structure of institutionalised bargaining that was in place prior 
to Sri Lanka’s authoritarian period. This erosion of the system of 
institutionalised bargaining eventually led workers to shift their support to 
more radical, ‘new left’ unions and culminated in a wave of extreme and 
violent forms of protest that chased away much needed foreign direct 
investment. The chaotic consequences of the labour repression suggest two 
primary conclusions: (a) that prior democratic mobilisation may make labour 
repression untenable over the long term; and (b) that repression may backfire, 
creating bursts of highly visible and destabilising protest that undermine the 
developmental objectives of neoliberal reforms.  
 
 Similar, if far from identical, considerations apply to the role played by the use 
of migrant labour to undermine secure pay and conditions, whether this leads to 
xenophobic protests and/or low-wage, low-cost, low productivity employment as 
opposed to upgrading and improved working conditions, Selwyn (2007) for grape 
production in Brazil and Champlin and Hake (2006) for a fascinating study of 
meatpacking within the most developed country! 
 
 For reasons that should be apparent, there has been an inclination in discussing 
industrial policy to jump between a number of models, whether corresponding or not 
to different ideal types of developing countries at different stages of development 
and/or with particular characteristics such as composition of outputs, balance of 
exports, etc. One set of models is pitched at the macro-level although it comes in a 
number of forms. It may be driven by Kaldorian notions of demand-led productivity 
increase, motivated by the salience of (dynamic) economies of scale and scope, or by 
import-substituting or export-oriented industrialisation. It may draw upon the notion 
of linkages from consumer to capital goods, from low-skill, low-technology, low 
value-added production to its high counterparts. And it may focus upon enhancing 
one or more indispensible factor in the processes involved, generically organised 
under notions of productive capabilities. Further, models of (industrial) development 
are increasingly recognising the skewed but shifting impact of global factors, around 
the patterns of access to trade, finance and (international) investment as well as 
insertion into global value chains and networks.  
 
 The point is less to accept or reject these models as such rather than to 
acknowledge that each offers some insight if take in conjunction with other relevant 
factors (or those judiciously chosen from other models). This is just to reiterate the 
previously argued proposition that industrial policy should be inductively derived 
from which the broad models around stages, processes and targets and instruments of 
policy, associated with the corresponding literature, can offer rich lessons, if not, to 
emphasise once more, models and blueprints to be emulated. To some extent, such 
uncertainties and complexities have been implicitly acknowledged but in two ways 
that are constructive in the form taken.  
 
 One of these is to be associated with Dani Rodrik and his collaborators, see 
above. In a sense, this offers an unwitting and diluted form of the DSP (which it 
otherwise ignores). It is vehemently opposed to the Washington Consensus, viewing 
state intervention as imperative to successful industrialisation. And, equally, it accepts 
that the contextual specificity of discovering, exploiting and developing comparative 
advantage is complex, diverse and difficult to model and capture. Accordingly, the 
conclusion drawn is that the state’s (industrial policy) interventions should be limited 
to those that facilitate “self-discovery” on the part of entrepreneurs through publicly 
provided support to infrastructure, training, skills, etc.  
 
 Crucially, this conclusion of light invervention does not follow from the 
correct premise of the diversity, complexity and contextual content of industrial 
policy. The agency of the state may well perform better in self-discovery quite apart 
from consideration of broader goals of development itself, of incorporating interests 
and participation of interests other than entrepreneurs, and of developing institutional 
capacities of the state to promote self-discovery (or more) where or whether this is, 
indeed, the appropriate focus for industrial policy in particular circumstances. In 
short, the support self-discovery model of industrial policy is this and no more; one 
model amongst many, of limited applicability on its own in the absence of, and 
integration with, other models and aspects of development. It also avoids, rather than 
addresses, the how, where and how of industrial policy  as far as the extent of state 
intervention is concerned. There is also a notable absence of account of interests and 
determinants other than those conjured up out of state-entrepreneur relations engaged 
in an exercise of self-discovery. This is at the expense of the other constituencies 
(such as labour, and corresponding meeting of basic needs) and other processes at 
both macro- and micro-levels, particularly as entrepreneurs may be induced to 
discover the short-term rewards of capital flight, financial speculation, and credit-
induced consumption at the expense of productive investment.56 
 
 Essentially, the Rodrik school eschews more extensive interventionism 
because of (recognition of) complexities, etc. At the other extreme, especially in the 
context of LDCs heavily dependent upon a few agricultural or primary products and 
with the most limited presence even in elementary manufacture, there is an 
understandable inclination to locate such economies and industrial policy as 
belonging at a particular, early stage of development. Consequently, industrial policy 
can be perceived relatively simply in abstract terms as involving the shift to the next 
stage of industrialisation.  
 
 This, however, begs a number of questions concerning the nature and dynamic 
within and across stages of (industrial) development. How do we know what is the 
current and next stage and how do we achieve it? As evidenced by the BRICS, and 
especially China, such economies simultaneously span and encompass all of these 
stages of development on both domestic and global scales. Of course, most LDCs are 
considerably smaller than the BRICS, and market size and scale of domestic resources 
are germane considerations (although, for example, shift to global networks in 
agriculture to serve affluent markets in the north both leapfrogs stages of development 
to some degree and offers local opportunities for industrialisation depending on how 
such production is served in its manufactured inputs whether at set-up or in passing on 
capacity and capability as part of conditions attached to foreign investment and 
participation). In any case the inductive approach to industrial policy is not primarily 
motivated, nor exhausted, by the presence of a more or less simple industrial 
structure. Rather, the complexity and diversity of industrial policy, and the need for an 
inductive if theoretically informed approach, derives from contextual specificity not 
from complexity of industrial structure or composition of output as such (although 
these are of considerable importance in an inductive approach itself in terms of 
integration of policy needs and performance within and across sectors). Once again, 
the specification of LDCs at an early stage of (pre-)industrialisation is a model (with 
variable and contested content) with corresponding strengths and weaknesses for 
policymaking, although equally offering rich lessons from comparative and historical 
experience. 
 
 Such considerations are brought to the fore in locating industrial policy in a 
wider developmental context, specifically in targeting both the meeting of basic needs 
and economic and social transformation. For, many of the activities associated with 
early stages of industrial development and meeting basic needs are labour-intensive  
and are open to domestic production. This is especially so for (the inputs into) social 
and economic infrastructure. The same applies to clothing and food processing. It is 
essential that these are seen as part and parcel of industrial policy, with corresponding 
attention to the inductively incorporated horizontal and vertical factors previously 
delineated. And models and blueprints, or categories of LDCs at different stages of 





 One of the major limitations of the DSP has been its neglect of social policy.58 
The position adopted here is very different in drawing upon and departing from the 
DSP. Significantly, this neglect, as Mkandawire (2010, p. 50) observes is 
complemented by the presumption that developmental states no longer offer the 
potential on which to construct social policy let alone to include it as part of the 
developmental state: 
 
One quite remarkable feature of the new social policy focused on MDGs or 
PRSPs is that the status and the requisite capacity of the state differ radically 
from the historical “success stories”. Thus far, these policies are tethered to the 
demise of the “developmental state”, both as a reality and as an aspiration. 
 
First, in many respects, there is no need to treat social policy as different from 
industrial policy as outlined previously, once recognising that social policy does itself 
offer general or horizontal and social provision. The education, housing and health 
systems are imperative for industrial performance and industrial policy neglects them 
at its peril. Second, by the same token, even if often primarily within the public 
sector, social is akin to industrial policy because it is sectoral, using inputs through a 
chain of provision to provide outputs even if these might be designated as public 
goods. 
 
 Until the Washington Consensus, mainstream social policy was dominated by 
the idea of creating and/or improving a welfare state, as an aspect of modernisation. It 
had its counterpart in critical literature in terms of whether welfare provision was 
adopted to be functional for the capitalist economy (in material and legitimising roles) 
or as a response to working class struggle to ameliorate conditions under capitalism 
(the so-called political economy of the welfare state). Over the period of neo-
liberalism, these traditions have been lost and two new orthodoxies have emerged. 
One is the welfare regimes approach associated with Esping-Andersen in which three 
ideal types (liberal, Scandinavian and authoritarian) are uncomfortably retro-fitted to 
developed countries and then, even more uncomfortably, extrapolated to developing 
countries where the lack of (retro-)fit between ideal types and empirical realities is 
cruelly exposed (whatever their legitimacy across different social policy programmes 
within developed countries). The second is associated with the new welfare 
economics which has taken neo-liberal antipathy to welfare (and its own commitment 
to privatisation and user charges) as point of departure to see welfare provision as a 
game in which the state and citizen strategise in relation to one another on the basis of 
different information and objectives (meeting minimum standards of living at 
minimum cost for the state, for example, but maximising income for minimum work 
by the individual). Currently, the IFIs are pushing this new welfare economics as it 
allows the different elements of welfare provision to be arbitrarily attached to one 
another (as with conditional cash transfers) and to build upon, and appear to be 
departing from, the previous policies of user charges and privatisation by promoting 
state support for private participation in welfare and economic and social 
infrastructure provision, to which I return below. 
 
 This new approach is deficient in two respects. First, in specifying social 
policy as a response to individual risk and vulnerability, it overlooks the systemic 
nature of economic and social reproduction, treating social policy as if it were the 
response to short-term shocks as opposed to a component part of development itself. 
Second, like the welfare regime approach even if based on universal deductive 
principles (merit goods, optimisation, market imperfections, etc) as opposed to ideal 
types, the new welfare economics is insensitive to the contextual differences that 
mark both countries and policies in terms of individual aspects of welfare provision. 
Child education means different things in different places at different levels of 
development, and is also provided and poses challenges that differ by context. 
 
The issue, then, is how to deal with the specificity of particular elements of 
social policy, in terms of their diversity of causes, content and consequences, without 
losing grip of the bigger picture. For the latter, pioneered by UNRISD, emphasis has 
been on locating welfare provision within the framework of the developmental 
welfare state.59 This has the advantage of foregrounding systemic change in both 
targeting development, welfare and the role of the state. The approach also remains 
sufficiently open to be able to accommodate different aspects and trajectories to 
development and welfare provision. 
 
Where does this leave the promotion of social policy and alternative public 
sector provision into the future? Initially, we can draw two general lessons. First, 
there is a need to insulate public provision from financialisation (the direct or indirect 
effects of turning provision into a financial asset however near or distant). 
Privatisation does incorporate finance directly with provision becoming subject to the 
vagaries of stakeholder value on the stock market; subcontracting does it indirectly as 
the firms involved require their own financial imperatives to be observed. In short, 
finance needs to be placed in a subordinate not a dominant position. This is easier said 
than done not least because, prior to the crisis, this was said to be true of the financial 
system in terms of its efficient mobilisation and allocation of funds for investment and 
its trading in risk. But financialisation continues to impinge upon public provision in 
multifarious ways that can only be guarded against as opposed to being absolutely 
eliminated, at least for the foreseeable future. 
 
Second, the vulnerability of public sector provision to erosion and distortion is 
a consequence of the absence of broader supportive institutions and policies in the 
wake of three decades of neoliberalism. Alternative public sector provision and new, 
broader policy capacities, and corresponding means and sources of finance must be 
built in tandem. 
 
Beyond these two generalities, we would emphasize the need to address the 
specificity of particular types and circumstances of public sector provision in terms of 
the diversity of causes, content and consequences to which they are subject, but 
without losing grip of the bigger picture.60 In particular, my own approach has been to 
posit the notion of public sector systems of provision, pssop. Specificity is 
incorporated by understanding each element of public provision as attached to an 
integral and distinctive system – the health system, the education system, and so on. 
Each pssop itself should be addressed by reference to the structures, agencies, 
processes, power and conflicts that are exercised in material provision itself, taking 
full account of the whole chain of activity bringing together production, distribution 
(and access) and use, and the conditions under which these occur. 
 
There is extremely strong support from an unexpected source for the pssop 
approach, in the context of the environmental impact of water, energy and other 
systems, to be found in OECD (2002, p. 8) alongside other studies in this programme 
of work: 
 
To analyse the key forces shaping consumption patterns, the report use the 
system of provision framework. The systems of provision approach analyses 
consumption as an active process, with actors seeking certain lifestyles, and 
constructing their identity by selective consumption and practices. The 
“systems of provision” is defined as the chain that unites particular systems of 
production with particular systems of consumption, focusing on the dynamics 
of the different actors (producers, distributors, retailers as well as consumers). 
In this light, it becomes clear that by the way governments design and 
transform energy, water and waste systems can either enable or obstruct 
household behaviour towards sustainable consumption. 
 
The systems of provision framework for understanding consumption patterns 
stresses the importance of exploring the mechanisms that shape everyday 
practices related to commodities and services and the extent to which they can 
be seen to support or impede sustainable consumption behaviour. In this light, 
household consumption is not the sum of individual behavioural patterns, each 
consciously motivated and evaluated by the actor. Instead, household 
consumption is a whole set of behavioural practices that are common to other 
households … They are social practices carried out by applying sets of rules 
and shared norms. They are also connected to production and distribution 
systems (technological and infrastructure network) that enable certain 
lifestyles that connect consumers to one another. 
 
Thus, the pssop approach has the advantage of potentially incorporating each and 
every relevant element in the process of provision, investigating how they interact 
with one another, as well as situating them in relation to more general systemic 
functioning. This allows for an appropriate mix of the general and the specific and, 
policy-wise and strategically, signals where provision is obstructed, why and how it 
might be remedied. This is in contrast to unduly focused approaches, those that 
emphasize mode of finance alone for example, as has been the case for housing both 
before and after its current crisis (as opposed to emphasis on who is building what, 
how, and for whom, with what means of access). At the opposite extreme are unduly 
universal approaches such as those that appeal to market and/or institutional 
imperfections, and which accordingly fail to recognize that water provision is very 
different from housing provision in and of itself as well as in different contexts.61  
 
The pssop approach has been addressed in Fine (2002) for the welfare state, in 
Bayliss and Fine (2008) for electricity and water, and in Fine (2009c and d and 
2011b) for social policy. We are not so much concerned here to develop, let alone 
impose, the pssop approach more fully as such for, in part, as already argued, it is 
essential to see it as an approach that needs to be contextually driven rather than as a 
source of the ideal types or universal theory that characterizes, and even mars, much 
of the current literature (leave things to the market, or correct market and institutional 
imperfections). Indeed, the purpose is rather to persuade of the need for something 
akin to the pssop approach irrespective of the method and theory with which it is 
deployed which will, no doubt, continue to be controversial, alongside the nature, 
depth and breadth of economic and social transformation essential for any significant 
change in provision to be secure. In other words, there is something different about 
water and housing, just as there is something different about South Africa and India. 
Further, though, this does allow for the results of existing studies to be incorporated 
into the pssop approach to the extent that they do identify, however partially, the 
factors involved in provision and how they interact with one another. Of course, in 
practice, sectorally-grounded approaches by electricity, health and water appear to be 
adopted as if by second nature. But this has not necessarily been so of how they are 
analytically broached, where sectoral and contextual sensitivity often gives way to 
universal prescription driven by the neoliberal fashion of the moment, whether 
privatisation, user charges, or public-private partnerships. At the very least, the pssop 
approach offers a framework with which to address policy needs in light of provision 
deficiencies, broadly interpreted, as opposed to general models and blunt recipes 
drawing to the fullest extent upon the “market”, i.e. private capital and finance, in 
practice even when recognising its deficiencies in principle. 
 
In addition, as highlighted in earlier accounts of the approach, not only is each 
pssop uniquely and integrally organised in provision, by country and sector, each will 
also be attached to its own meaning and significance for those engaged with (or 
excluded by) it. For example, whether public provision is seen as household risk 
management against vulnerability or collective provision towards developmental 
goals is both cause and consequence of material provision itself and, equally, subject 
to debate (or not insofar as different approaches exist in parallel with one another 
according to context). As also argued in the approach, the cultural (in the widest 
sense) system attached to each pssop is also integral with material provision and is 
generated along and around that provision itself. Without going into details - but for 
the issue in other terms such as laid out in the second paragraph above in the quote 
from OECD (2002) - the culture and meaning of public provision, thereby, becomes 
subject to what has been termed the 8Cs - Constructed, Contextual, Chaotic, 
Construed, Contradictory, Contested, Collective, and Closed (Fine 2009g). This is 
important for developing and understanding the meanings attached to public 
provision, not least in prising them away from the negative stance attached to the 
neoliberal ideology of public provision.  
 
One apparent weakness of the pssop approach, a consequence of its strength of 
examining provision comprehensively within sectors, is its distance, at least initially, 
from the synergies and interactions across sectors, as with the role of “horizontal” 
factors (as opposed to the “vertical”) such as equity, labour conditions, and 
macroeconomic impacts. Arguably, however, these need to be addressed in their own 
right and in the context of particular sectors within which they are rooted. Indeed, the 
dialogue between generic and sectoral issues is vital in designing, promoting and 
defending public sector alternatives. 
 
By way of illustration, reference can be made to the first application of the 
pssop approach, if not explicitly in terminology,62 in MERG (1993), as part of a 
policy programme for the economic and social infrastructure for post-apartheid South 
Africa covering, in particular, health, schooling, housing and electrification. As 
universally recognised, there can be little doubt about the contextual specificity, and 
deep-rooted, nature of the inherited provision in South Africa, with numbers of 
elements in common across the separate sectors of provision, or pssops, in light of the 
particular form taken by apartheid. Nonetheless, it was and remains crucial to 
acknowledge the inherited differences in existing manner, levels and incidence of 
provision as well as the sectorally-specific challenges involved within the wider 
context of the continuing dynamic (and transformation) of the South African economy 
and society more generally, Fine (2007). Significantly, in adopting what are generally 
acknowledged to have been neo-liberal policies at macro- and, to some degree and as 
a consequence, micro-levels, it is only now that this is being seen as a serious case of 
mismanagement as far as public sector service delivery, not least as a developmental 
state is now being touted as an alternative approach, see above. 
 
But the virtues of the pssop approach can also be acknowledged through the 
wider evidence on service delivery across the developing world, with wide disparities 
in success and failure with limited correlation with per capita income (and 
corresponding implications for such correlations with HDIs). Thus, levels of literacy 
and health provision in Kerala and Cuba are examplary and offer lessons in a 
comparative exercise for how corresponding pssops might be addressed in other 
countries by contextually informed emulation. As Katz (2004, p. 763) puts it in 
critical response to the Sachs Report, “Primary health care is, of course, one of the 
public services required to provide the conditions for good population health”. Yet, 
“We have 100 years of solid public health experience demonstrating that access to 
decent food, clean water, adequate sanitation, and shelter are the major determinants 
of health”, p. 756. And much the same, if also different by context and meaning, 
could be said of education, nutrition, housing … 
 
The pssop approach is in marked contrast to that taken by the World Bank 
whose current stance on social policy incorporates five fundamental characteristics.63 
The first is the continuing influence of its roots within the rhetoric, scholarship and 
policy perspectives of the Washington Consensus. There is a corresponding lingering 
presumption of social protection as the response to random shocks that induce 
individual or household vulnerability that requires at most temporary relief in 
deference to market solutions.  
 
Second, though, is the flexibility and discretion that is exercised in departing 
from the Washington Consensus. More or less anything can be incorporated on a 
piecemeal but also, to some extent, an umbrella basis. But this is precisely where the 
World Bank falls totally short on a more general scale despite the two other features 
of departing the Washington Consensus and incorporating more or less anything as 
social policy and in its interactions with more or less anything else.  
 
For, as a third aspect of the Bank’s new social policy, it becomes 
developmental without any notion of development, able to include anything that is 
associated with development (good or bad, to be promoted or alleviated, and, 
inevitably, technicist for the purposes of economic and social engineering). In a sense, 
putting aside the scope of what is included and the marginally more favourable stance 
towards the state as against the market, this marks a major continuity with the 
Washington Consensus, for each shares in common a method to get development 
without a specification of what it is! For the Washington Consensus, it is reliance 
upon market forces, whereas its successor depends upon correcting market and 
institutional imperfections as well as their accompaniments of poverty, bad 
governance, inequality, and so on to include anything else for legitimacy or discretion 
in policy.  
 
Fourth, despite the increased attention to social dimensions of development, 
the World Bank has adopted a fragmented in line with its piecemeal approach. Moser 
(2008, p. 47), for example, complains: 
 
The World Bank does not have a specifically defined social policy as such. 
Within the institution, three predominant social policy “domains” can be 
identified: social sectors, social protection, and social development. The fact 
that each has a distinct location within the organization has served to create 
artificial conceptual and operational barriers to a holistic social policy. 
 
Of these domains, social development is seen as the least developed. Whilst her 
jointly edited volume showcases the role of “assets” as a means of pursuing social 
policy, her own take on its absence from the Bank might better be seen as being the 
social policy itself to which piecemeal and fragmented correctives are now being 
appended. The review of Holzman et al (2009, p. 1) of World Bank policy over the 
course of the first decade or so of the new millennium reports that: 
 
The first social funds were prepared in the late 1980s to help communities 
cope with short-term adverse impacts of structural reforms. These funds 
expanded rapidly to become a central part of the Bank’s poverty reduction 
efforts in low income countries. 
 
Following on from the pensions and financial crises of the 1990s, ad hoc 
arrangements eventually gave way to a new framework integrating social protection 
and labour, “based on the conviction that risk and access to risk management 
instruments matter for development”, Holzman et al (2009).  
 
Fifth, the Bank’s own figures, though, tell a different story in terms of the 
levels of support given to social policy and for what. Over the eight years from 2000, 
total expenditure on “Social Protection and Labor Lending” amounted to a little less 
than a mere $10 billion.64 However in relation to the dollar a day poverty count, this is 
in the region of a dollar per year for the world’s poor. Much more significant is the 
number of country Risk and Vulnerability Assessments for which funds will have 
been used in financing consultants, with a total of 127 such Assessments over the 
period. At about $10 million offered per country per assessment per year, the Bank 
might be thought to have purchased any corresponding influence over policy at an 
extremely low price. 
 
This is brought out very clearly in the contributions of Holzman and Kozel 
(2007a and b) with social policy perceived as social risk management (SRM), with 
little regard to endemic and systemic poverty, which is hardly a risk to be managed. 
Poverty and social policy/protection cannot legitimately be treated as if attached to 
income and “shocks” alone. As Guenther et al (2007, p. 17) puts it “In policy terms, 
SRM leads to interventions that focus on transitory income shocks rather than on 
structural determinants of poverty”. Indeed, the presence of the analytical and policy 
tensions involved in all of this is confirmed by Ravallion’s suggested response to the 
financial crisis in “Bailing out the World’s Poorest”. Is poverty short term or long 
term; do we target temporary or permanent measures? For Ravallion (2008, p. 21): 
 
Even a highly successful effort to protect the living standards of the world’s 
poorest from the global crisis will leave a reality in which poor people face 
multiple risks on a daily basis, well after the crisis. If the crisis does create the 
opportunity for building an effective safety net then it should become 
permanent, dealing simultaneously with crises and the more routine problems 
of transient poverty in normal years. It will be an integral part of the country’s 
poverty-reduction strategy, recognizing that the impact of a shock is intimately 
connected to deeper problems of underdevelopment: credit and insurance 
market failures, underinvestment in local public goods, and weak institutions. 
The synergies between safety net interventions and longer-term poverty 
reduction can be reinforced by explicit de[s]ign [sic] features, such as 
incentives to encourage the children of poor families to stay in school or 
emphasis on building assets of value to poor communities.  
 
So, everything is connected to everything else in both analytical and policy terms, and 
Ravallion can close: 
 
There will no doubt be relatively low frequency events, such as the current 
global financial crisis, for which extra external aid will be needed, and 
certainly justified on moral grounds when it was the rich countries of the 
world that were largely responsible for the crisis. However, the domestic 
resources should be sufficient to cover a normal sequence of shocks as well as 
modest demand in normal years. The budgetary cost of such a permanent 
safety net need not be very high and it could well bring longer-term efficiency 
gains to the economy. The budgetary outlay could well be highly variable over 
time in risk-prone settings, entailing some fiscal stress.  
 
But if developing countries can and should take responsibility for themselves except 
when subject to financial crises other than of their own making, how does this relate 
to a more systemic role not only in “promoting longer-term recovery” – the term 
deployed in Ravallion’s abstract for his working paper, and begging the question of 
recovery to what – but also in bringing about economic and social transformation? 
This at most implicitly raises the issue of how to locate social policy in the broader 
contexts of systemic analysis and development as transformation but, unsurprisingly, 
offers no answers. 
 
There are, then, considerable and shifting tensions in the World Bank’s 
positions on social policy across ideology, scholarship and policy. These can be 
highlighted by addressing the one major innovation that has marked policy over the 
recent past and continues to sustain considerable momentum, conditional cash 
transfers (CCTs). CCTs have rapidly shot to prominence over the past decade, 
particularly in Latin America but also elsewhere, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
Kenya and Pakistan, World Bank (2009, pp. 32/3):65 
 
Paralleling the rise in the number of countries (now 29) with programs has 
been an increase in the size of some programs. Mexico’s program started with 
about 300,000 beneficiary households in 1997, but now covers 5 million 
households . Today, the federal Bolsa Família program [in Brazil] serves 11 
million families or 46 million people. In other countries, the increase in size 
has been less explosive, but still notable.  
 
There are, however, wide variations in both absolute and relative coverage of such 
programmes by country, as well as their cost as a percentage of GDP and the 
generosity of benefits as a percentage of mean household consumption.  
 
For the World Bank, CCTs serve in some respects as an ideal instrument in response 
to the second phase of neo-liberalism in crisis. Yet, as Chief Economist, Justin Lin, 
puts it, World Bank (2009, pp.xii/xiii): 
 
Even the best-designed CCT program cannot meet all the needs of a social 
protection system. It is, after all, only one branch of a larger tree that includes 
workfare, employment, and social pension programs … As the world 
navigates a period of deepening crisis, it has become vital to design and 
implement social protection systems that help vulnerable households weather 
shocks, while maximizing the efforts of developing countries to invest in 
children. CCTs are not the only programs appropriate for this purpose, but as 
the report argues, they surely can be a compelling part of the solution.  
 
Accordingly, the level and design of the programmes in practice are discretionary; the 
boxes of addressing the poor, children, and health and education are ticked; there is 
potential for institutional and other externalities into broader social provision; 
ambition in potential is matched by modesty of aspiration; and, analytically, there is 
scope for spillovers, and general equilibrium effects, empirical investigation of short-
run as opposed to long-run impact, and for theory drawing upon market and 
institutional imperfections to be corrected on a piecemeal basis.66  
 
Most telling, though, is the detachment of CCTs from broader economic and 
social provision other than as the context in which they may or may not succeed. 
Conditioning income support on accessing health and/or education is contingent upon 
these being available. As noted by the World Bank (2009, p.202): 
 
Clearly, a supply of health and education services of adequate quality must be 
developed … Cash transfers may be the right policy instrument to alleviate 
poverty in the short run, but their contribution to longer-term poverty 
reduction also will depend on what happens on the supply side.  
 
As Soares (2009) concludes:67 
 
In sum, CCTs are not panaceas to strengthen the (emergency) resilience of 
families and states. But they have features that can be used to lessen the 
impact of a crisis as long as they are integrated in a broader social protection 
strategy whose goal is not solely to work as a minimal and temporary safety 
net. 
 
Such integration cannot, of course, be guaranteed. Mattei and Sanchez-Ancochea 
(2010), for example, find that while the Brazilian Bolsa Familia has offered some 
poverty relief, it has done very little for longer-term educational and health outcomes, 
with conditionalities either merely being met in a token fashion or given levels of 
provision being redistributed across the poor. 
 
Freeland (2007, p. 75) dismisses CCTs as “Superfluous, Pernicious, Atrocious 
and Abominable”. Drawing upon Samson (2006) and a South African case study, he 
finds “it is typically the poorest and most vulnerable who will find it most costly to 
comply with any conditionalities, and are therefore the most likely to be deprived of 
benefits if they fail to do so” (p.77). Conditioning transfers on meeting criteria of 
children’s health and education falters on lack of facilities to deliver and/or access 
these, and weak capacity to deliver conditioned transfers (p.75). 
 
Even programmes that meet certain criteria of success may prove 
unsustainable administratively or politically.  Despite various achievements, the 
Nicaraguan CTT programme, attached to child education and health, was 
discontinued. According to Moore (2009, p. 36) this was due to a lack of 
understanding and misrepresentation of its achievements upon transfer of 
responsibility from one ministry to another. She closes with the observation that, 
“Although RPS [Red De Protección Social] had a disappointing conclusion, all is not 
lost”. For, “in its own uniquely complex environment [we] can remind policymakers 
to be aware of the balance they must keep in performing well for international 
stakeholders while securing domestic acceptance of their own programmes”. But how 
to guard against the transfer from one ministry to another, the shifting interests of 
external (and domestic) agencies and so on?  
 
In this respect, like all social policy, outcomes necessarily both reflect and 
contest entrenched structures, processes, powers and agencies. At a specific level, let 
alone more generally, the idea that there will be universal solutions on how to balance 
(or more exactly transform and promote, respectively) one against the other borders 
on the ridiculous in both analytical and strategic terms.68  
 
Whilst there are those that express support for CCTs as a major success with 
continuing potential subject to careful, contextual implementation, Fajth and Vinay 
(2010), the more sceptical at most perceive CCTs as welcome if providing momentum 
towards universalism in social policy: “its ultimate success depends on a simultaneous 
expansion and improvement of universal services in health and education”, Mattei and 
Sanchez-Ancochea (2010, p. 2). Universalism is set against the conditional, targeted 
ethos of CCTs, and viewed as more effective and secure in practical and political 
terms.69 
 
In this respect, there is a stunning silence across the World Bank literature, 
and much more besides. It is as if the welfare state as the embodiment of universalism 
does not and has never existed. And, of course, much the same is true of the absence 
of the (radical) political economy of welfare literature that approached the status of 
orthodoxy a generation or so ago, focusing on the design and function of welfare for 
advanced capitalism.70 These absences are hardly surprising for the Washington 
Consensus, not least with its neo-liberal and Americanised inspirations, but why 
should it be so for the post Washington Consensus, not least with its rediscovery of its 
own version of Keynesianism, market imperfections, public and merit goods, and so 
on? By contrast, the modernisation aspirations of what might be termed the pre-
Washington Consensus were heavily influenced by the notion of emulating the 
welfare states of western Europe. For this, in contemporary developing country 
circumstances, we need a marriage of the pssop approach with that of the 
developmental welfare state. And, again in acknowledgement of, if moving beyond, 
the political school of the DSP, such an approach is liable both to promote the 
interests of, and strengthen the presence of, those who have most to gain by its 
developmental content as opposed to consolidating neo-liberal forms of governance 
that have so signally for LDCs over the past decades.  
 
South-South Cooperation by Way of Conclusion 
 
From our previous accounts, it is apparent that developmental state, industrial 
policy and social policy each serve as umbrella terms. They do so for a complex, 
diverse, shifting and selective amalgams of factors with equally varied incidence 
across historically, socially, institutionally and country-specific causes and outcomes. 
Necessary to take into account, there are different stages and aspects of development 
for putative developmental states to negotiate. These range far beyond latecomer 
catch-up industrialisation to earlier and later stages of development. For this, 
corresponding technological and production paradigms are potentially more varied 
and more liable to be misled than led by notions of flying geese (and other 
metaphors). Industrial policy needs to be derived inductively through case-by-case 
study from refined consideration of a multitude of horizontal and vertical factors 
specific to sectors and countries. Horizontal factors are generic across the economy as 
whole such as levels of employment and skills. Vertical factors relate to the chain of 
activity specific to the industrial sector itself. It is necessary to reject the notion that 
one or more models can suffice to fit all circumstances, even if selected from a 
portfolio for application. This is also so of inappropriately relying upon mantras, or 
dogmas, concerning privatisation, trade liberalisation or not, and so on. 
Developmental states also need to address other aspects of development such as the 
role of agriculture, welfare, the shifting nature and incidence (and corresponding 
constraints and opportunities offered by) global factors, and relations beyond those 
between state and industry (to incorporate the role of labour and democratisation and 
institutions beyond those that facilitate industrial policy directly). 
 
Similarly, in and of itself and as a key element for developmental states and 
development itself, it is necessary that social policy is neither specified merely as a 
safety net nor as poverty relief alone. Indeed, these should be rejected even as 
defining the core of social policy although they do represent important functions and 
goals. Rather social policy should be understood as comprising a mix of sectors of the 
economy, differentiated by sector and context and appropriately understood as such. 
Health, education, and economic and social infrastructure more generally are very 
different and are even appropriately understood as forms of industry in their own right 
with characteristics of their own along their chains of provision. In short, they are 
health and education systems, etc. As such, this equally defies off-the shelf models as 
a guide to understanding and policymaking, whether these be attached or not to state 
provision, targeting, user-charging, privatisation, public-private partnerships, 
privatisation and so on.  
 
Further, in a globalised and increasingly globalised world, this itself needs to 
be unpicked as it is subject to multiplicities of contents, meanings and understandings, 
each of which is subject to differing incidences, ranging over trade, finance and 
investment through aid and IFI policy to the ideologies of neo-liberalism and its 
various opponents and their policy proposals. This means it is more and not less 
imperative that national policymaking should be systemic and holistic, not piecemeal 
and blinkered. It is necessary not to set aside the inevitable and unavoidable elephant 
in the room of globalisation that constrains national policymaking. But nor is it 
necessary to defer either to globalisation’s putative beneficial effects as would be 
claimed by neo-liberals or to its rigidly determining influence as some of its 
opponents would have it. Rather, it is not helpful or accurate to view the role of the 
state as either more or less salient in the contemporary world. In its nature and forms, 
and in the underlying economic, political and ideological interests through which its 
actions are determined, it remains complex, shifting and contradictory as it always has 
been. 
 
 It is important, however, to acknowledge that the current financial crisis has 
substantially increased both the role of the state and its prominence in economic 
affairs. This has, however, tended to be confined to be driven by and behalf of 
finance. This is doubly unfortunate. On the one hand, it seems to seek to restore the 
status quo ex ante which, despite favourable circumstances for more favourable 
outcomes, has been associated with relatively low and uneven rates of growth 
globally, especially across the poorer developing countries, with lost decades as a 
result. On the other hand, three decades of neo-liberalism and its close associate, 
financialisation, have been responsible for squeezing out the potential for formulating 
and implementing alternative policies. A thorough and wide-ranging rethink of the 
role of the state is essential that breaks with the experiences and ideologies of the past 
but which, nonetheless, remains sensitive to the lessons that can be drawn from the 
experiences of successful, and failed, developmental policy and the role the state has 
played within it. 
 
These observations point to outcomes at opposite extremes. One is of 
pessimism for, on the one hand, the complexities and diversities involved in 
policymaking would appear to defy the possibility of ever making any (well-founded) 
policy at all. On the other hand, as adopted here, a realistic as opposed to an 
optimistic stance is one which recognises that there has been a vast flow of policy 
with mixed content and outcome on which to draw. Indeed, not making policy is not 
an option as this is itself a policy and one which has rarely prevailed in the pure form 
demanded by neo-liberal postures. Extensive intervention has predominated in 
practice and that this is so, of course, is true not only in national arenas but also in 
international collaborations, South-South or otherwise. The result has been a 
proliferation of deals, with Baldwin (2008) for example viewing “Factory Asia” as 
suffering a “Noodle Bowl” syndrome as far as its tangle of bilateral trade deals alone 
are concerned (quite apart from the conflicts of interests that arise from those who 
feed directly or indirectly, or even accidentally, from the bowl). Further, Baldwin 
poses questions such as “who should take the lead?” and “what should be the long-run 
goals?” as far as cooperation is concerned and, unsurprisingly, concludes that these 
have no easy answer and so have been left unanswered. He also asserts that the time 
for an East Asian vision is gone with a greater need now for East Asian management, 
not vision.71 And for Chia (2007), South-South cooperation across the dimensions of 
regionalism, bilateralism and multilateralism is captured through the metaphor of a 
“spaghetti bowl”.72 As will be seen below, this raises what should be the unavoidable 
issues of management and vision for whom and by whom, with answers not 
necessarily being reduced to constituent countries and the international cooperative 
organisations on which they rely or form. 
 
Similar considerations apply to the spaghetti and noodle bowls of other 
regions, most notably Africa and Latin America. For these as well, if possibly less so, 
the mere presence of China looms large. As already discussed, its impact is equally 
mixed, complex and diverse, defying simple nostrums even if attracting a 
proliferation of metaphors – as developmental engine, conduit, lead or lagging flying 
goose, exploiter of sitting ducks, steamroller, piggy for piggy-back, and so on. This 
appeal to metaphor is itself indicative of the difficulties of formulating appropriate 
general theory or analysis, as is equally reflected by the mix of the metaphors 
themselves. In a sense, so large and diverse and rapidly if unevenly developing itself 
is China that as far as South-South cooperation is concerned, it offers the full range of 
conundrums across the spectrum – as source of demand in global networks, as source 
of demand to growing middle-class consumerism and working class basic goods, as 
competitor in cheap assembly, as leader or intermediate producer in higher value 
products, as foreign direct investor within and across public and private sectors, as 
competitor for inward foreign direct investment, as conduit and competitor for export 
markets in developed countries as well as import competitor with domestic production 
for domestic demand, and as a major source of global demand for primary products 
with corresponding strategic political imperatives for this and other reasons. 
 
This suggests a different metaphor of its own for understanding how to 
approach South-South cooperation from an analytical perspective, with the literature 
understandably having suffered from an inadequacy of tools and principles necessary 
to address the complexity and diversity of the issues involved. This is to view (South-
South) cooperation through the prism of aid or, more fully, aid and development. The 
reasons for doing so are that, even if roughly, South-South or other cooperation can be 
viewed as if it were aid across its various dimensions. Of course, such cooperation is 
generally free of the hierarchy associated with the donor-recipient syndrome, 
including the presence of international organisations and NGOs, etc. These have a 
mixed record as far as serving as facilitators, drivers, or impediments of development 
are concerned. However, whilst the donor-recipient relationship characteristic of aid 
and development is absent in the context of (South-South) cooperation, this does not 
mean that there is an equal absence of unequal relations between the countries 
involved and that all can participate on an equal basis (as indicated by the China 
syndrome). Indeed, if without the donor-recipient relationship as such, it is apparent 
just how much the issues associated with (South-South) cooperation match those 
associated with aid and development across the causes and outcomes involved and the 
means that might be used to achieve them.  
 
The (South-South) cooperation literature, from an initial grounding in the 
trade creation versus trade diversion approach derived from customs union theory, has 
evolved to fill the spaghetti/noodle bowl. Unsurprisingly, the literature on aid has 
suffered a similar fate. To parody, the mainstream literature divides into two 
extremes, with agnostics situated somewhere between the two, Tarp (2006) for an 
overview from these perspectives.73 Aid is good and promotes development or aid is 
bad, has little or no effect and can even be counterproductive in reinforcing the 
obstacles to development that seem to make it necessary in the first place. It is, of 
course, no accident that these positions tend, respectively, if imperfectly to reflect 
positions on the state versus market dichotomy (with more leftwing adherents 
collectively if inconsistently caught between demanding more aid and also seeing it as 
an instrument of control if not exploitation). Time and space do not offer the 
opportunity to review this literature in depth, and so yet a further metaphor might, 
necessarily clumsily and inexactly, do the work. Consider advertising not least in light 
of the dictum of Lord Lever, historically leading entrepreneur in the provision of 
household goods to the British Empire and beyond, that, “I know that 50% of my 
advertising works, but I just don't know which 50%”. Of course, this is not the 50-50 
of tossing a coin but a recognition that the processes of how advertising works, or not, 
remains complex and possibly mysterious.  
 
Much the same 50-50 syndrome would appear to apply to (South-South) 
cooperation although the exact probabilities and distribution of costs and benefits are 
not necessarily so even. As with aid, it is important to recognise why this is so in 
order not to throw out the baby with the bathwater on the grounds that neither 
cooperation nor aid is worth the toss (although advertising, like these, tends to grow 
from strength to strength other than in times of stress when, of course, protectionism 
and more become more prominent in consideration as potential policy levers). 
Significantly, in reviewing Asian aid other than for Japan, Kondoh et al (2010) 
observe of its “Emerging Donors” that, p. 1: 
 
The aid patterns employed by the emerging donors are divergent. Chinese aid 
has shifted from the overtly political and ideological to the commercialist; 
thus, current Chinese aid is closely tied to Chinese state owned enterprises 
(SOEs). Korean aid has consistently been commercialist, but recently it has 
incorporated universal and humanitarian considerations. Thailand has 
maintained a keen interest in aid as a stabiliser of its neighbouring countries. 
The Indian aid program was initially formed during the Cold War consonant 
with the ideology of the Non-Aligned Movement, but from the 1990s 
economic considerations became more important. Indian aid is influenced also 
by regional strategies, namely the stabilisation of neighbouring countries. 
 
This demonstrates the continuing lack of an aid model (or the only model is that there 
is no model) so diverse across time and place, motive and outcome, etc, are the 
determinants and consequences of aid. Once again, in light of the analogy between aid 
and cooperation, this suggests how inappropriate it is to seek to construct general 
models for either.  
 
And for Japan itself, the most significant development over the past few 
decades has been the sharp decline in the volume of aid, reversing the trend that saw it 
become the world’s largest donor in the 1990s, Palanovics (2006) for an account.74 
However, the less Japan spends on aid the more it seems to become pre-occupied with 
interrogating its goals, administration and impact, as reflected in the ODA (2007) 
Manifesto. This incorporates more general trends in official thinking (i.e. those of the 
IFIs), such as promoting private sector participation (Task 9 and Proposals 23-26) and 
rewarding model countries (Task 10, Proposal 29). It is, however, far from clear how 
a holistic vision and strategy (Task 1) can be targeted when it can range over so much 
complexity of both development itself and the diverse contexts with which it is 
associated.  
 
Thus, to reiterate, if South-South cooperation is, as it were, mutual aid by 
other means, exactly the same applies to its shifting origins, levels, motives, forms 
and outcomes. But this is tied into a closely-related but separate issue from which 
considerable insight, possibly lessons, can be learned from the aid syndrome. This is 
to interrogate the capacity to deliver cooperation and what are the determinants of its 
content and outcomes in principle and practice. For, on occasion, the criteria for 
managing and assessing aid are constructed through grand theme or nostrum 
concerning development – as in modernisation and neoliberalism for example, 
although each of these is comprised of varieties of scholarship, ideology and policy in 
practice when examined in detail. But in principle and in accelerating practice over at 
least the last two decades, aid has itself been situated across a multiplicity of elements 
around development. These ought to be familiar enough to those in the aid business if 
exercising some degree of circumspection but is strikingly illustrated by the collection 
edited by Cornwall and Eade (2010), entitled Deconstructing Development Discourse: 
Buzzwords and Fuzzwords. The latter B and F words include entries on poverty 
reduction, social protection, globalisation, participation, citizenship, empowerment, 
social capital, gender, sustainability, rights, NGOs, social movements, country 
ownership, transparency, accountability, corruption, governance, fragile states, and 
knowledge.  
 
This proliferating lexicon of developmental considerations is matched by an 
equally alarming volatility in the nature and incidence of aid itself across types, 
volume, goals, outcomes and impact. In case of Africa, for example, which receives 
more aid absolutely and in per capita terms than elsewhere, it is not simply a matter of 
destabilising fluctuations in the volume of aid, but the emergence and exponential 
growth of an “aid complex”, Oya and Pons-Vignon (2010, p. 180) drawing on Riddell 
(2007): 
 
Each individual recipient country deals with an average of 26 different official 
donors …over 35,000 separate official aid transactions were reported in 2004 
… individual African ministries are overloaded by aid proliferation. For 
example, Tanzania had over 2000 donor projects ongoing in the early 1990s, 
while the Ministry of Health in Mozambique alone managed over 400 projects 
recently. 
 
It is as if aid has become the surrogate goal, so that managing aid for development 
becomes a substitute for development itself. For, as Oya and Pons-Vignon conclude, 
the capacity of the state is itself concentrated on relating to donors and managing aid 
as well as being undermined by the antipathy to the state under the Washington 
Consensus. Indeed, p. 176: 
 
The burden of aid management, coordination and execution, as well as the 
biases introduced in public administration through technical assistance and 
conditionality-led loss of policy space, have contributed to the formation of 
states (a) that now seem unable to deal with long-term strategic issues; (b) are 
ill-suited to creative and innovative policy thinking; (c) are far too constrained 
by the fragmentation and ideological biases of the aid complex; and (d) remain 
more preoccupied with managing and maximizing aid than with long-term 
development goals. 
 
Further, p. 186, in citing Chang (2006), the range over which the aid complex needs 
to be managed is limitless, for “these days, there is virtually no area on which the 
Bank and the Fund do not have (often very strong) influence – democracy, judicial 
reform, corporate governance, health, education, and what not”. 
 
The consequences of such spread are various and go beyond, or different from, 
what might be termed mission creep, or even gallop, under which aid is attached to a 
proliferating portfolio of conditionalities and criteria of assessment. There is simply 
created huge scope for discretion. Aid can, for example, be considered successful 
because it has achieved one or more, if not many, of any number of goals (however 
accurately and honestly assessed). By the same token, aid can be deemed unsuccessful 
for failure on one or more, of any number, of goals across the buzz and fuzz. And, 
equally, the goal of development itself can either fade into the background as some 
specific target serves as proxy for it (poverty reduction for example) or development 
is foregrounded but by reducing it to one or other target (growth per capita) as a 
magic bullet for achieving development.  
 
Once again, considerable insight into cooperation can be extrapolated from 
piggy-backing on aid and the aid literature. This is so around issues of proliferation of 
goals, agencies, and the criteria and standards of assessment of performance (allowing 
for self-selecting reviews of success of failure). And, possibly most important, there is 
a need for close consideration of the institutional and political capacity to deliver 
across these factors, taking account of delivery by whom and for whom given the 
different constituencies that drive outcomes within, between and across nations (in a 
world of globalisation).  
 
As yet, if only because of being a newer or lesser mature kid on the block than 
aid, (South-South) cooperation, is less promiscuous (if far from monogamous) in 
terms of the factors by which it is determined and assessed. But, as indicated by the 
noodle/spaghetti bowl syndrome, it clearly does already range over the broadest terms 
from forging political alliances across nations to promoting more narrowly defined 
economic progress within and across them. And, here, the evidence from the capacity 
to deliver appropriate national policies does not offer comfort for those wishing to 
extend these policies and policy making to South-South cooperation. This is often 
admirably driven by a wish to complement, or even to displace, the dominance of 
North-South economic ties and policy influence that is taken to be responsible for 
lack of development in the South. But, even to the extent that national policy making  
can be prised away North-South ties and influences (which can themselves benefit 
from, and even be strengthened by, South-South cooperation), such prospects should 
not be viewed through rose-coloured spectacles, dreaming that such cooperation will 
kick-start a reverse process of enhancing national policy by virtue of knock-on or 
demonstration effects or be driven through the necessity of feedback effects on 
national policy derived from South-South cooperation. A significant problem within 
the South, as well as between South and North, is the uneven levels of development, 
capacities, and powers, as evidenced by the rise of China for example. These cannot 
be brushed aside any more than the unavoidable presence of the North as South-South 
cooperation is engaged. South-South cooperation is no panacea and nor can it be 
presumed that there is solidarity or unity of purpose within and across the South by 
virtue of the shared incidence of being relatively poor or, for the privileged minority, 
of being amongst the poor. 
 
In short, capacity to engage in South-South dialogue and cooperation is not 
simply some technical issue of merely negotiating for mutual gain in the absence of 
Northern interests and influence (as for the economic school’s approach to the 
developmental state, see above, shifted from the national to the international level). 
Nor is it simply a matter of the creating the appropriate institutions, with sufficient 
autonomy over nations, capable of promoting positive sum outcomes for its 
constituents (as for the political school’s approach to the developmental state, see 
above, shifted from the national to the international level). Rather, South-South 
cooperation will need to derive from a dialogue across political and economic factors 
that both reflect, but also cut across, participating nations. In a nutshell, in case of 
finance, for example, this is both national and international and so will not fit neatly 
with national interests which will, in any case, be contested. The same applies both to 
trade and production insofar as these are attached, as they are to a significant extent, 
to global networks and value chains, with corresponding configurations of conflicts of 
interest within the South as well as between it and the North.  
 
In short, the noodle/spaghetti bowl syndrome is a reflection both of these 
fragmented and conflicting interests across a multitude of diverse factors and an 
indication that South-South cooperation requires capacity that goes beyond simply 
negotiating between one nation and another for mutual gain. For, such gains, if 
realised, divide within and across nations and are not simply national as such. Further, 
there are serious questions over the levels and sources of such capacity to negotiate. 
For, as Mkandawire (2010) observes following Evans (2004), all policy capacity let 
alone action, following decades of neo-liberalism, has been subject to “institutional 
mono-tasking” favourable to the promotion of private capital, what Mkandawire 
(2009) himself refers to as “institutional mono-tasking”. Nor is it surprising that the 
IFIs should back-pedal on (South-South) cooperation given that their priority has been 
to get national policy in order with a content that will, in any case, tend to exhibit 
antipathy to state intervention at national let alone higher levels of governance. 
 
Mkandawire (2010, p. 51) also points to the extent to which aid, and 
corresponding policy perspectives, have shifted “empowerment” to the micro level 
and complemented this by disempowerment at the macro level (or possibly, more 
accurately, re-assigned power by shifting it within and away from national sources to 
national and international elites, and especially if by no means exclusively to those 
attached to finance). This corresponds in the world of scholarship to the shift in 
understanding of development (policy) from the systemic (old development 
economics and its focus on macro/structural change) to piecemeal considerations (the 
new development economics and its focus on the micro and piecemeal change). 
Indeed, if in the context of social policy and poverty alleviation in his discussion but 
of much wider relevance for other areas of policy, this reconfiguration of 
(dis)empowerment from macro to micro is associated with corresponding shift in 
power across various constituencies, p. 44: 
 
New social policy and poverty agendas are driven by NGOs, international 
organisations, and national elites with very different agendas than the 
progressive movements that inspired the formation of welfare states in the 
past. 
 
And, by the same token, both institutional capacity and willingness to deliver, and 
driven by whom and in whose benefit, are liable to be telling determinants of the 
creation and outcomes of (South-South) cooperation. This is necessarily so given the 
multiplicity of forms and content that these can and will adopt across countries at 
different and diverse stages of development and with different and diverse capacity 
for, and drivers of, policymaking in national let alone international arenas.  
 
In short, on past experience, there is surely little doubt that South-South 
cooperation will proliferate, albeit in the “polluted” environment and impure forms 
associated not only with mixed motives and mixed participation and influence from 
outside the South but also on the basis of equally uneven and diverse capacities and 
motives from within economies within and across the South itself.75 This suggests that 
South-South cooperation is best addressed through what might be termed a highest 
common factor rather than lowest common multiplier approach. In other words, this is 
not to facilitate, support and proliferate agreements as they arise but to advise a softly-
softly stance in pursuit of secure benefits, promoted by and accruing to targeted and 
deserving constituencies, subjecting such agreements and policies for cooperation to a 
circular process of policy formulation, implementation and monitoring of outcomes 
that feed once more into policy formulation (and corresponding institutional capacity 
building within and across participants for the processes). On this basis, much more 
secure foundations will evolve for national and cooperative policymaking in equitable 
and developmental terms, offering a bit more and a bit more variety of protein in the 
noodle/spaghetti bowls on offer. 
 
More specifically, what are the lessons that we might learn for South-South 
cooperation from the experience of China (and earlier developmental states) and from 
the experiences of the impacts of China (and ditto)? First is that, for the prospects and 
goals of South-South cooperation, such cooperation tends to be a consequence not a 
cause of development. In other words, national policy making must be on a sound 
footing as a precondition for sound cooperation.  
 
Second, in this respect, the origins (and proliferation) of cooperation in trade 
agreements (and, to a much lesser extent, monetary unions) can be the source of 
possibly counter-intuitive and misleading indicators as far as approaches to (South-
South) cooperation  are concerned. For, whilst trade may be the leading and most 
prominent form taken by South-South economic relations, there is no reason to 
presume that it is of prime or sole importance in national policy making nor that such 
issues in cooperation across nations can be handled independently of other policy 
issues within them.  
 
Third, then, what are the issues of significance for national policy making 
which must be addressed as a precondition for success in South-South cooperation. 
Broadly, and overgeneralising, it is not simply national policymaking that still 
remains crucial but that, in contemporary conditions, especially in the wake of the 
current crisis, developmentalism and a corresponding positive role for the state 
depend upon: insulating the mobilisation and allocation of finance from 
financialisation in all of its forms; the promotion of secure domestic provision of 
goods for domestic consumption especially as far as the meeting of basic needs and 
poverty alleviation are concerned; and a strong commitment to state provision of 
social and economic infrastructure attached to a developmental welfare state, and 
targeted industrial (and other) strategies designed to expand employment and 
productivity in line with corresponding increases in wages.  
 
Finally, and with a flourish, if such policies could be put in place within 
countries of the South, considerable strides could be made in harnessing them to the 
positive benefits of (South-South) cooperation. But, by the same token, far from 
South-South cooperation being appropriately served and underpinned by national 
policymaking, it is also national policymaking that should be served and not 
constrained by such cooperation. If we have one lesson to learn from the lost decades, 
it is that North-South cooperation, formal or informal, market or otherwise, is not the 
model to be emulated within the South, even if it could be. 
 
This last reservation, for example, is germane in relation both to South-South 
and, slightly or considerably different, regional cooperation. For both, levels and 
types of development of participating economies are liable to be mixed and uneven. 
For regional development in particular, the sorts of “spaghetti” to be found in the 
bowl of cooperation (and, possibly, integration but not, for example, for sub-Saharan 
Africa with South Africa as pole, strongly oriented towards the North, and similarly 
for middle-east oil-rich economies), are liable to be those inspired on a case-by-case 
basis in light of costs of transport and communication. For the latter, of course, 
finance has increasingly come to the fore with new developments increasingly 
attached to North-South with at most regional and subordinate hubs, no least as 
financial systems have been liberalised. In consideration of transport costs, though, in 
contrast, regional integration and cooperation (other than for primary products 
destined for use in the North for manufacturing or consumption) trade agreements are 
liable to be promoted.  
 
These may serve the developmental goals or participating economies. But, as 
with all trade policy, these will serve, represent and promote some constituencies at 
the expense of others as well as commanding and building institutional capacities 
within and between states. That trade is easiest to identify, and possibly to negotiate, 
does not necessarily mean that it is most important and beneficial. What has been 
observed more in the breach of both South-South and regional cooperation (and 
international integration more generally) is the issue of migration. Here, an 
appropriate starting point in part by way of explanation for this exception, is the 
political sensitivity and corresponding conflict around representation of interests 
involved which tend to defy national let alone international resolution.  
 
There are the interests of the migrants themselves in terms of wages and 
conditions and security of livelihoods. Also involved are employers looking for wider 
sources of recruitment, possibly at exploitative wages and conditions, possibly with 
skilled labour at the expense of the economy of origin, although equally a source of 
remittances and potential return of skills and experience. And there are also the 
interests of native workers who can consider their jobs, wages and conditions and 
bargaining power as undermined by competition from migrant workers, or even that 
the latter gratifyingly undertake paid employment for undesirable jobs on terms that 
would be unacceptable to others. Further, like migration itself, such interests and how 
they are represented, with what outcomes, are fluid not least in the wake of the global 
crisis. At least, no one doubts just how important are migrant workers to the 
economies of LDCs in terms of both employment and remittances as international 
financial flows. 
 
In addition, each of these issues is irreducibly attached to social policy, 
broadly conceived, as migrant workers, at least in principle, are dependent upon 
conditions governing provision of and access to basic needs, with the attendant risk of 
denial of their rights, alongside inferior wages and conditions, and even dangers of 
attacks upon them contingent upon levels of public provision and conditions of access 
to them. This suggests that a key issue both for South-South and regional cooperation 
is the formulation of policy in relation to migration that goes beyond legal rights, 
border controls and access to one another’s labour markets as such. Indeed, migration 
might be considered to be the most tangled and unrecognised of the pastas (or is it the 
sauce) in the spaghetti bowl, both most deserving of attention and most likely to reap 
“highest common factor” rewards of consolidating and building mutual capacity for 
South-South cooperation and integration in relation to (1) enhancing North-South 
relations; (2) building capacity for further cooperation and beneficial integration; (3) 
incorporating social into industrial policy; (4) sharing policy perspectives, lessons and 
experiences across industrial, social and labour policy.  
 
These insights are illustrated by the experience of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), which first signed a trade protocol in 1996, 
following the demise of apartheid.76 As SARDN (2011a, p. 1) puts it, “progress in the 
region to reap the benefits purported to accompany regional economic integration 
appears limited”. Levels of trade within the region remain limited, and expanding 
outside the region with limited diversification into new products. There is an 
acknowledged need for greater coordination across targeted infrastructure and an 
acknowledged “lack of political will among SADC member states towards practically 
unlocking the benefits that accompany regional economic integration”, p. 2. 
Significantly, in meeting poverty alleviation let alone broader developmental goals, 
attention is placed on the impact of volatile and peaking fuel and food prices, and the 
interaction between them, as subsidised bio-fuel “threatens poor households’ food 
supplies”, SARDN (2011b, p. 1), a problem that needs to be addressed through the 
Southern African Customs Union, SACU.77 Indeed, it is suggested that, SARDN 
(2011c, p. 2): 
 
Food security is at the core of the poverty problems and hence gains from 
regional economic integration, specifically from gains from trade, can improve 
food security through increased agricultural and agro-industry cross-border 
investment. 
 
Significantly, attention is also paid to issues of migration and more general policy 
harmonisation and how to reconcile national with regional interests (and to handle the 
attraction of seeking more readily achieved short-term gains through non-regional 
integration). The point is less that these issues can be settled once and for all but that 
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